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1. Introduction
Improving forest management is a difficult challenge all over the world. It is a problem
that affects all countries irrespective of their social order, political regime and level of
development. In Russia, during the current period of transition, endeavors to solve these
problems have been hampered by long delays in the elaboration and implementation of
a new forest legislation.
The Forest Code of the Russian Federation, finally adopted in 1997, does not raise any
hopes that the forest sector will show much progress in the years to come. Forest sector
policies should be consistent with the state’s broader environmental, economic and
social objectives, and forest sector reforms should be integrated into the country’s
overall economic reform program. The new Forest Code largely disregards these facts.
An important task in the development of a forest policy under current market conditions
is to identify an optimal unit of forest management. An effective forest management
system requires incentives, which would stimulate the interests of both forest managers
and forest users.
A further elaboration of the forest legislation is an essential but difficult task under the
present conditions in Russia with rapidly changing social and economic relations and an
ongoing constitutional process. The forest legislation has to deal with issues of forest
ownership, forest management and use as well as the implementation mechanism. These
complex issues require special attention and since they should be considered jointly it
would probably be a good idea to approach them on the regional level.
Siberia contains 42 percent of Russia’s total forest lands and 9 percent of the world’s
total forested areas. Two thirds of Siberia’s forests are to be found on the territory of
Krasnoyarsk Krai. To engage these resources in a sustainable forest exploitation is an
important task for society and should not be disregarded because of the development of
other natural resources in the region.
The forest sector is of great importance in Krasnoyarsk Krai. Historically, it played a
vital role in the regional economy. The sector made a considerable contribution to the
regional GDP, to exports, trade income and employment. However, its contribution to
the regional economy has sharply decreased during the last ten years, partly as a result
2of the general deterioration of the Russian economy. Nevertheless, the forest sector is
still making a significant contribution to the region’s economy. It has a considerable
potential for reconstruction of its production and exports on the basis of a sustainable
forest management. But in order to realize this potential a number of conditions should
be met and profound reforms in the sector must be achieved.
In this report the institutional problems affecting the Krasnoyarsk forest sector are
analyzed and a number of recommendations for improving the institutional structure of
the sector are proposed with due consideration of the possible socioeconomic
development of the region as well as the challenges and restrictions imposed by the
environmental conditions.
The report consists of eight chapters. In the next chapter the characteristics of the forest
resources of Krasnoyarsk Krai are considered. Chapter 3 focuses on institutional aspects
and the environment of the regional forest sector during the transition period. It includes
a description of the forest management structure and the organization of the regional
forest industrial complex. The fourth chapter describes the current socioeconomic
situation in Krasnoyarsk Krai through an analysis of a number of characteristics, such as
population and education. In Chapter 5 the relations between the political structures and
the forest sector are discussed. In Chapter 6 the focus is on institutional problems and
shortcomings, such as the forest legislation, and general problems concerning the
enterprises belonging to the regional forest complex. Chapter 7 discusses in more detail
some of the previously described features and problems of the Krasnoyarsk forest sector
based on a survey of a number of forest enterprises in the region. The final chapter of
the report contains conclusions based on the performed analysis as well as
recommendations on how the current situation in the Krasnoyarsk forest sector might be
improved.
The descriptions and analyses of the current institutional structures contained in this
report were based upon a series of interviews with representatives of twenty-six forest
enterprises in Krasnoyarsk Krai and a data collection about the state of the forest
resources, the socioeconomic situation in the region, the formal political and
administrative structure and its relation to the forest sector as well as its formal and
informal institutional configuration. These data were supplemented by information
retrieved from IIASA’s Forestry project database and a number of secondary sources.1
                                               
1
 The design of the present study basically follows that of a series of studies of the institutional embedding
of the forest sector in seven other Russian regions made within IIASA’s Forestry Project. The
questionnaire used for the enterprise interviews as well as a “case study instruction” to guide the
collection of information on the regional forest sector can be found as an appendix to the IIASA case
study report on Arkhangelsk (see Carlsson et al., 1999). The following case study reports have already
been published by IIASA: Carlsson and Olsson (1998a), Carlsson and Olsson (1998b), Carlsson,
Lundgren and Olsson (1999), Carlsson et al., (1999), Efremov et al. (1999), Fell (1999), Kleinhof,
Carlsson and Olsson (1999), Piipponen (1999), and Ivanova and Nygaard (1999). Other publications from
the project include: Lehmbruch (1998), Malmlöv (1998), Mashkina (1998), Fell (1999), Jacobsen (1999),
Pappila (1999), Carlsson (2000), Carlsson, Lundgren and Olsson (2000), Nysten-Haarala (2000), Mabel
(2000), and Wignall et al. (2000).
32. The Characteristics of the Krasnoyarsk Forest Fund
Krasnoyarsk Krai is an important forest region. More than 7 percent of Russia’s
growing stock (on lands belonging to the state forest fund) can be found on the territory
of Krasnoyarsk Krai. According to data from the Forest Management in Krasnoyarsk
the total area of the forest fund lands was 81.1 million ha as of January 1, 1998 (Table
2:1).
Table 2:1. Comparative characteristics of the Krasnoyarsk forest fund lands in 1996
(million ha).
Forest fund area
Forest fund area
of the Russian
Federation
Forest fund area
of Krasnoyarsk
Krai
Share of Russian
Federation forest
fund area, %
All land area 1,110.5 81.1 7.3
of which:
   stocked land area 705.8 51.9 7.4
   non-forest land area 336.3 21.6 6.4
   unstocked land area 68.4 7.6 11.1
Group I 221.7 35.3 15.9
Group II 61.0 0.5 0.8
Group III 827.8 45.3 5.5
Source: Official data of the Krasnoyarsk Krai Forest Management for 1 January 1997.
The forested area is estimated to be 51.9 million ha, which corresponds to 64 percent of
the total area of the forest fund lands in the Krai. In 1997, this area increased by 75,600
ha, mainly owing to reclassifying young forests to forested lands (Table 2:2).
According to Chapter 9 of the Russian Forest Code, the forest fund is divided into three
groups, Group I, II and III. Group I forests include non-commercial forests with
environmental functions, including water preservation and recreation qualities. Forests
belonging to Group II are located in sparsely forested and densely populated areas and
are protected for industrial and recreational reasons. They mostly consist of forests with
a limited exploitable value. Group III includes commercial forests primarily situated in
densely forested regions.
The share of forests belonging to Group I is twice as large in Krasnoyarsk as the
average for the Russian Federation. This share is so large as 21.8 million ha of pre-
tundra forests is included in this group. As of 1 January 1998, the total forest area of
Group I reached 35.3 million ha or 43.5 percent of the total area of the region’s forest
fund. The share of Group II forests in Krasnoyarsk (0.6%) is very much lower than the
corresponding share for the Federation (9.6%).
The annual increase of Group I forest areas as well as of specially protected nature
reserves contributes to the preservation of biodiversity in the region’s forests. At the
4same time, the decrease of final harvesting and the drastic reduction of cutting in the
whole forest fund due to economic reasons is resulting in an increase of areas with
overmature stands and a decreasing forest quality. Today, some 5.1 billion m3, or 68.1
percent of the total growing stock, belong to the mature or overmature category. The
overmature forests alone amount to 2.9 billion m3.
According to the Forest State Account (1 January 1998) the total growing stock in
Krasnoyarsk Krai amounts to 7.47 billion m3, of which 6.08 billion m3 (81.4%) is
conifers, 1.37 billion m3 (18.3%) broad-leaved species and 10.83 million m3 (0.1%)
bushes.
Table 2:2. Dynamics of the state of the forest fund managed by the Krasnoyarsk Krai
Forest Management 1995–1998 (1,000 ha).
1995 1996 1997 1998
Total area: 80,734.1 81,033.4 81,069.6 81,109.6
   including stocked area 51,439.3 51,774.7 51,871.1 51,946.7
   unstocked area 7,764.7 7,688.3 7,641.3 7,771.9
   Group I 54,253.4 34,889.7 35,292.4 35,385.1
Conifers: 36,903.7 31,717.1 37,085.2 37,051.7
   young 2,682.7 2,724.5 2,839.3 2,845.2
   medium 5,146.5 5,143.6 5,158.5 5,093.0
   maturing 5,107.0 5,121.5 5,157.6 5,176.3
   mature and overmature 23,967.5 24,027.5 23,930.3 23,937.2
Broadleaves: 12,510.3 12,713.1 12,723.7 12,838.0
   young 1,876.5 1,891.8 1,896.9 1,950.3
   medium 3,252.7 3,276.4 3,272.6 3,299.4
   maturing 1,251.0 1,240.8 1,239.4 1,245.9
   mature and overmature 6,130.1 6,304.0 6,314.8 6,342.4
Forests transferred from the forest fund 8.1 1.3 0.3 1.6
Forests transferred to the forest fund 3.1 305.0 36.5 41.6
Forests accepted from other forest owners - 305.0 36.5 -
Source: Official data of the Krasnoyarsk Krai Forest Management.
The forests in the region periodically suffer from fires, pests, diseases and industrial
pollution (Krasnoyarsk Forest Management, 1997). The damages inflicted on the forest
steppe and the southern taiga in the region affect 62–85 percent of their total area. Due
to a number of anthropogenic and natural factors only 5–10 percent of virgin mature and
overmature stands have been preserved. The forest lands in Krasnoyarsk are among the
most “fire prone” areas in Russia. During the period 1984–1997, 12,953 forest fires
were registered and affected 936,400 ha of forests. Thus, on average about 65,000 ha of
the forested area in the region were annually wasted by fires. 1996 was the worst year
for the region in terms of forest fires. The area destroyed by fires that year amounted to
5266,000 ha and the economic losses were estimated to be 500 billion rubles (in 1997
prices). Seventy to eighty-five percent of all wild fires in the Krai take place in the
Priangara raion of the Angara-Yenisei area.
There are periodic outbreaks of mass reproduction of the Siberian gypsy moth, which is
the main pest in the coniferous taiga forest. The last outbreak occurred in 1994–1997
and affected one million ha of forest lands with its main thrust in the Angara and
Yenisei region causing forest destruction on an area of 140,000 ha containing an
estimated volume of totally destroyed timber of 50 million m3. The costs of fighting this
fire amounted to 35 billion rubles (in 1997 prices). The total economic loss has been
estimated to be 6,179 billion rubles. The volume of wasted timber was more than six
times larger than the total volume logged in 1997 and equaled the annual allowable cut
(AAC) of Krasnoyarsk Krai.
Industrial pollution of the forest is a serious problem in the tundra zone. During the last
50 years the environment here has been severely disturbed by the gas and dust
emissions of the Norilsk copper-nickel complex (Goskomekologiia Krasnoyarsk, 1997).
Presently, some 500,000 ha of forest lands have been heavily damaged or destroyed
while the area containing partly destroyed stands is several times larger. Forest stands
located up to 200 km from a pollution source are greatly damaged by these emissions
and at a distance of 80–100 km the forest survival ratio is close to zero.
Species Composition
Krasnoyarsk Krai is one of the richest forest resource bases in Russia. Several valuable
species grow here, such as Scotch pine, Siberian pine, and Siberian larch. Pine, larch,
and Siberian pine (Russian cedar) are dominating among the forest forming species
(Table 2:3).
Table 2:3 Growing stock and main species distribution in 1997.
Species Thousand ha Million m3 Percent
Pine 9,587.0 1,703.17 25.9
Spruce 6,045.0 861.96 16.3
Larch 7,700.7 1,094.53 20.8
Cedar 8,003.7 1,577.63 21.6
Fir 5,715.0 847.58 15.4
Total conifers 37,051.4 6,084.87 100.0
Birch 10,517.1 1,001.34 82.1
Aspen 2,296.7 369.02 17.9
Total broadleaves 12,813.8 1,370.36 100.0
Source: Based on the State Forest Account for 1 January 1998.
6Solving problems related to the efficient use and regeneration of the Krasnoyarsk forest
resources are closely related to the improvement of forest accounting. This is due to the
fact that the forests in the Krai have some specific characteristics, such as uneven-aged
stands, a mixed species composition, widespread occurrence of hidden wood defects,
and weakly developed transportation roads. All this results in a need for improving
existing forest inventory methods and making inventories more precise in order to be
able to produce better plans for forest utilization and regeneration.
Development of the Forest Fund
The importance of and the need for studying the forest fund has been officially
recognized by the forest inventory instructions issued in 1964, 1985, and 1995. In the
“Instructions on conducting forest inventories in the forest fund of Russia. Part II” from
1995 it is emphasized that analyses of forest fund dynamics shall serve as a basis for
determining priorities in the planning for forest regeneration aimed at countering
negative tendencies in forest use. However, forest inventory practice shows that
analyses of the dynamics of the forest fund are only formally conducted and can not
serve as a basis for long-term planning.
According to the methodological recommendations of A.S. Sheingauz (1986), the
methods for analysis of forest fund dynamics could be divided into two groups, in
accordance with practices in (a) forest fund accounting and (b) in forest management.
The first group of practices allows one to make analyses at the administrative-economic
units according to which the forest fund account forms are completed, that is, starting
from a forestry enterprise (leskhoz) and summing up to the entire country. The second
group of practices can suitably be used at the level of the individual forestry enterprise
or its sub-units.
Table 2:4 shows the dynamics of the total and forested area as well as the growing stock
for the last 37 years after the first Forest State Account of Siberian forests was
conducted.
In the period 1961–1993, large changes took place. The total forested area of the Krai
increased by 14.4 million ha, mainly due to the inclusion of the sparse pre-tundra forests
in the forest fund. Nevertheless, the total growing stock decreased by 2.6 billion m3. The
reduction of mature and overmature growing stock was 3.1 billion m3. The current forest
increment could not exceed the losses of growing stock caused by natural calamities and
harvesting. Coniferous stands were mainly harvested and therefore the area and stocking
of deciduous species were insignificantly reduced.
7Table 2:4 Changes in total area, forested area (thousand ha) and standing growing
stock (million m3) of the Krasnoyarsk Forest Fund, 1961–1998.
Year 1961 1973 1988 1993 1998
Total area 145,360.9 144,940.6 161,760.5 159,759.5 81,109.6
of which
   forested area 107,154.8 108,271.2 112,355.4 103,624.2 51,946.7
Conifers 87,609.1 89,615.9 93,951.7 80,929.6 37,051.7
Mature and overmature 69,613.2 70,421.2 72,552.7 54,766.1 23,937.2
Broadleaves 18,506.6 17,648.1 17,310.6 15,778.0 12,838.0
Mature and overmature 9,981.8 9,318.2 7,876.8 7,804.9 6,342.4
Total growing stock 14,352.53 13,511.13 13,824.22 11,740.30 7,466.06
Conifers 12,705.70 11,903.36 12,281.85 10,175.19 6,084.87
Mature and overmature 10,612.29 9,946.96 10,051.58 7,417.26 4,155.45
Broadleaves 1,627.61 1,590.69 1,524.19 1,542.12 1,370.36
Mature and overmature 1,088.98 1,117.59 971.32 1,026.47 927.70
Source: Based on State Forest Accounts in 1961, 1973, 1978, 1993, 1998.
During the last five years the forest dynamics of the region has not changed much.
According to the 1998 Forest State Account, the total forested area of the region has
decreased by 78.6 million ha. This reduction in area is due to the separation of the
Evenkia Autonomous Region.
8Figure 2:1 Transportation network in Krasnoyarsk Krai (Data sources: Oblast
boundaries for the Russian Federation from the IIASA Russian Forest Study Database.
All other data from the Digital Chart of the World, Environmental Systems Research
Institute, Inc. (ESRI).
93. Institutional Structure of the Krasnoyarsk Forest Sector
Forest management and forest ownership in pre-revolutionary Russia were similar to
practices in western developed countries. Beside state and communal forests, private
forest ownership was widespread. Forest management was determined by the economic
and technical potentials of the forests.
The founder of forest management theory in Russia, M.M. Orlov, divided Russian forest
management into two categories: the organization of management personnel and forest
management methods (Giryaev, 1999). Three levels of forest management were clearly
outlined and this structure prevailed during 200 years of Russian forestry history. The
structure contained the following main levels:
• a central administrative organ;
• provincial, regional, republican administrative-observational units; and
• local executive units.
The main organizational issue in forest management concerned the question about
which juridical person should function as the local executive organ of the State and
what should be its tasks.
In the history of Russian forest management one should note three important reforms.
1826, when forest districts (so-called lesnichestva) were established in state forests to
function as the local executive organ of forest management. 1929, when the forest
districts were abolished, complex forest units called leskhozy (forest enterprises) and
lespromkhozy (integrated forest harvesting enterprises) were established. These units
functioned as local executive organs of state forest management and forest harvesting,
respectively. And 1993, when leskhozy, as the local executive organ of forest
management, were forbidden to do final cuttings and to process wood obtained from
such cuttings.
For more than 100 years (1826–1929) a unique forest management system successfully
functioned in Russian state forests. It was based on forest districts (lesnichestva) with an
average area that was 1.5–2 times larger than the area of contemporary forest districts
but only 20–50 percent of the area of a contemporary leskhoz. This system had a market
orientation, both in its forest exploitation and in forest maintenance. Until 1917, income
from forest utilization in Russia largely exceeded expenses. In 1913, the expenses for
forest management amounted to a mere 35 percent of the forest income obtained by the
state treasury.
However, at the end of the 1930s, when the Soviet command-administrative system was
substituted for the prevailing market oriented economy, a radical restructuring of the
forest management system began. When leskhozy were established in 1929 it only
added an extra intermediary link in the forest management chain. It did not improve the
forest management system at all. Forest districts were transformed into forest blocks
called uchleskhozy. In principle, this reorganization has remained until the present time.
It is only on paper that the forester is an independent forest master. Since 1929 until the
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present, the functions of state forest management has been performed by the leskhozy in
their capacity as juridical persons.
During this period, the complex forest enterprises (leskhozy) received their main
funding (62.6%) from the budget. Income from industrial activities also contributed a
large share (20%). Simultaneously, income from wood deliveries amounted to 73
percent of the budget funds dedicated to forest management. Totally, this forest income
and the profits from the leskhozy’s industrial activities greatly exceeded the funding that
the leskhozy obtained from the budget. Thus, the leskhozy were profitable enterprises
and the forest sector as a whole was positive for the State.
In their capacity as complex forest enterprises the leskhozy harvested wood, procured
machines in a centralized fashion to perform forest work, and provided the wood
supplies and forest products prescribed by the plan. Today, however, they have lost their
importance in this respect. On the other hand, in accordance with the forest legislation,
the leskhozy have maintained and even strengthened their administrative-observational
functions, which are often duplicated or replaced by the Regional Forest Managements
(the regional units of the Federal Forest Service) in the various subjects of the
Federation. The Regional Forest Managements are, for example, granting leases of areas
belonging to the state forest fund, organizing sales of growing stock through forest
auctions, solving problems related to the withdrawal of forest lands, performing state
control of forest management, budget distribution, coordination of forest protection
against fires and pests, fighting large wild fires, determining payments for the utilization
of forest fund lands as well as determining the share of such payments to the leskhozy
for performing forest management.
It could be mentioned that only one important executive function — the harvesting and
processing of wood obtained from intermediate cuttings — is still left with the leskhozy
allowing them to earn some money of their own. However, and this is somewhat of a
paradox, in reality the major part of intermediate cuttings are actually performed by the
forest districts (lesnichestva), i.e., by the state forest protection. Moreover, as a juridical
person, the leskhozy use the forest districts to accumulate their own resources.
Data in Table 3:1 below show that modern forestry, as a branch of the Russian
economy, is unprofitable for the State. In 1997, the forest income amounted to less than
50 percent of the budget funding for forest management. The resources produced and
spent by the leskhozy for their own needs are not taxed.
Table 3:1. Receipts and expenditures of Rosleskhoz, 1997.
Form of
income
Income
mill. rubles (%)
Form of
expenditure
Expenditure
mill. rubles (%)
Sum total 2,071 100 Sum total 3,409 100
of which timber
   lease charges 913 44 of which leasing 2,017 59
mobilization of
   internal funds 1,158 56
mobilization of
internal funds 1,392 41
Source: Based on Giryaev, 1999.
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Today, forest management is expected to be gradually reshaped from the command-
administrative system of the Soviet times, based on complex forest enterprises and
centralized planning, to a market oriented system. However, a hard centralization of
forest management nevertheless remains a clearly negative ingredient in the existing
Russian forest management system.
The Structure of Forest Management in Krasnoyarsk Krai
The Forest Management of Krasnoyarsk Krai was founded on 1 August 1947. It
represents the state (federal) forest management in the Krai (cf. Figure 3:1). The
Regional Forest Management decides about the use of forest resources in the Krai and
coordinates its work with the Krai departments of environmental protection, land
resources, as well as hunting, fishing and water departments. Furthermore, it negotiates
contracts with the Krasnoyarsk Areal Forest Fire Defense (Avialesookhrana), with the
East-Siberian State Forest Inventory (lesoustroistvo), with various research institutes,
and with the Siberian State University of Technology in Krasnoyarsk. The Krasnoyarsk
Forest Management has eight departments:
1. Department of Forest Resources and Forest Fund Exploitation.
2. Department of Reforestation.
3. Department of Forest Protection.
4. Department of State Control.
5. Department of Especially Protected Areas.
6. Economic Department.
7. Department of Business Accounting, Finances and Control.
8. Department of Staff, Social Assistance, Labor Protection, Building and Informatics.
12
Figure 3:1. The structure of Forest Management in Krasnoyarsk Krai
(Source: Based on information provided by the Krasnoyarsk Forest Management, 1999).
Krasnoyarsk Forest
Management
Municipal (Raion)
Administration
Administration
of Krasnoyarsk Krai
Leskhozy
Lesnichestva
West-Sayan Experimental
Forestry
State National Park
“Shushenskiy Bor”
State Forest Protective
Institution
Divnogorsk Leskhoz-Technical
School
Federal Forest Service
of Russian Federation
Government of Russian Federation
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Forest inventories (lesoustroistvo) in Krasnoyarsk are mainly carried out by the East-
Siberian State Forest Planning and Inventory (Lesproekt). This organization has 115
employees. Temporary seasonal workers are regularly used for field inventory work.
The number of seasonal workers depends on the volume of work to be performed and
available funding. The activities of Lesproekt is supervised by the Department of Forest
Resources of the Krasnoyarsk Krai Forest Management.
The State Forest Protection in the region has a clear structural and territorial division.
There are 56 leskhozy consisting of 244 forest districts (lesnichestva), 450 forest
compartments (uchastki) and 1,500 forest tending plots (obkhody). There are 324 chief
foresters (mastera) on the staff of the leskhozy and the air fire fighting brigades have
340 employees.
The basic division in this organization is the forest fire protection units of the leskhozy
and forest users, among them 104 fire-chemical stations. During summertime forest
users maintain more than 200 mechanized groups to fight forest fires. There is an
intense interaction between all these units. The Krasnoyarsk Air Forest Fire Defense
(Avialesookhrana) has 27 strategic subdivisions in Krasnoyarsk Krai, in the Evenkia,
Tuva and Khakassia districts. The Krasnoyarsk Air Forest Fire Defense patrols the
forests of the region from the air, and when it discovers a fire it sets out to fight it. At its
disposal the Avialesookhrana has 650–700 parachutists and landing firemen. It also has
a training center and leases up to 50 airplanes and helicopters of different types.
The state “Protection Center of Krasnoyarsk Krai” (Tsentr zashchity Krasnoiarskogo
kraia) is responsible for the coordination and implementation of a unified forest
protection policy against pests and diseases. It has departments for forest protection,
soil-chemistry, expeditions, and an entomological laboratory. The center employs 46
specialists.
The Department of Forest Regeneration of the Regional Forest Management deals with
reforestation problems. There are 45 permanent and 15 temporary forest nurseries in the
region where plants are grown. The leskhozy provide for their own needs of coniferous
plant materials and seeds. Attention has recently been given to the issue of establishing
a forest seed supplier based on selection. To this end the Ermakovski Selective Forest
Seed Center was established in 1991. It was later, in 1996, transformed into the West-
Saian Experimental Forestry Unit specializing in Siberian pine selection
(Goskomekologiia Krasnoyarsk, 1997).
Institutional Setting
As in the Russian economy as a whole the most radical reorganizations of the
Krasnoyarsk forest industrial complex took place in September 1992 and in connection
with the first stage of privatization in 1993–1994.
The possibility of getting access to forest resources, to be able to finance small
investments in newly established enterprises, which could be registered at the regional
level and obtain permission to export, all prompted a demonopolization process within
the system of the former USSR Ministry of Forest Industry (Sokolov, 1998).
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At the beginning of the 1990s, more than 90 percent of all enterprises in wood
harvesting and processing were privatized. As a result a great number of production
cooperatives and small enterprises — later also private joint-stock companies —
appeared. The joint-stock companies are to a substantial part owned by top managers in
the forest industry. In almost all such cases these enterprises turned out to be profitable,
while the integrated harvesting companies (lespromkhozy) were not able to show
profits.2 It could also be noted that many highly specialized enterprises were privatized,
enterprises that produced goods and services which lost their market under the new
conditions. Private intermediary trade organizations appeared and grew. This had a
destabilizing effect on regional forest industrial production. The result was that only a
small share of the new enterprises (primarily the export-oriented ones) managed to
adapt to the new conditions and work independently on the market and reconstruct their
production of products for which there was a real demand.
In 1995, the “privatization for money” stage began. This meant that the former state
enterprises belonging to the forest industrial complex had to offer more than 51 percent
of their shares for sale on the stock market. This was the start of a new redistribution of
the forest enterprises.
In the course of economic reform the forest industrial complex was never at the center
of interest of the federal authorities. The earlier existing state management of forest
industrial branches and enterprises was decentralized. At the regional administrations
offices for the reconstruction of the forest industrial complex were established to help
restructure enterprises and attract investments. At the federal level the responsibility for
elaborating a sector development strategy has constantly been shuffled from one
authority to another during the transition period 1992–1996. Currently, the coordination
of this activity rests with the Ministry of the Economy and a Deputy Minister
administration controlling the forest sector and with the Ministry’s Department of
Forest Sector Economics.
According to data provided by the RF Ministry of the Economy, 69 percent of all forest
industrial enterprises have suffered losses during the first 11 months of 1998 in spite of
privatization. Accounts payable by the forest industry amounted to 47 million rubles,
while accounts receivable were only 14 million rubles. The debts of the forest sector to
the State (including budget and non-budget funds) exceeded 18 billion rubles. This is
equal to more than half the annual volume of forest sector production. Only 5 percent of
all forest enterprises related to the forest complex were able to increase their efficiency
during 1998 (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 January 1999).
At the beginning of the 1990s, Russia was the second largest commercial wood
producer in the world, on average producing more than 300 million m3 round timber per
year. The forest sector contributed three percent of the total national income and
guaranteed work for about two million people.  By the end of the 1990s, the harvesting
capacity had decreased sharply to 85 million m3 in 1997 and to merely 72 million m3 in
1998. This capacity decrease was primarily caused by the economic recession, but also
by the social and political instability characterizing the transition period following the
collapse of the former Soviet Union. It should also be noted that the pace at which
                                               
2
 This information was provided by the Department of Forest Industry, Krasnoyarsk Krai Administration.
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institutional structures and forest management regimes have been formed does not
match the general pace of the country’s economic reforms.
Organization of the Krasnoyarsk Forest Industrial Complex
The structure of the forest industrial complex of Krasnoyarsk Krai is typical of the
forest raw materials regions of Russia. The region has a large forest harvesting. The
forest industrial complex includes 800 forest harvesting enterprises (60 large ones),
more than 100 sawmills, 2 board factories, and a pulp and paper plant. According to the
Department of Forest Industry of the Krai Administration, one fifth of the Krasnoyarsk
forest enterprises are considered to be large, 45 percent are middle-sized, and 35 percent
are small enterprises. According to the same source, 53,330 people were working in the
forest industrial complex as of 1 January 1999, 1,680 people were directly engaged in
cutting, 3,400 worked the skidding tractors that transport the logs from the forest to the
upper landings. Another 6,390 people were engaged as drivers of log trucks used for
long-distance timber transportation. About 1,000 people operate logging terminals.
More than 10,200 people work in cutting areas and at landing sites. Road construction
and road maintenance engage close to 1,300 people. Some 18,000 people work with
primary wood processing, mainly sawmilling. Close to 4,300 are occupied with machine
repair and technical services, while about 5,500 people do subsidiary work. Only about
1,140 people are professionals, engineers or managers.
The Krasnoyarsk forest complex contains some large holding companies, five regional
state enterprises, 31 federal state enterprises, as well as a number of other enterprises
(cf. Figure 3:2). For example, 35 enterprises belong to the Joint-Stock Company
“Yeniseyles” (see Table in the Appendix). Among these companies there are nine large
forest industrial enterprises, eleven lespromkhozy, some investment companies, a
construction firm, trade enterprises, two banks, an insurance company, a security
service and a sanatorium. In 1996, total production in the region reached about 2 trillion
rubles. The share of the joint stock companies noted in Figure 3:2 of this total was 1.5
trillion rubles, or 75 percent.
The formation of a united production structure, as the one depicted in Figure 3:2, is
accomplished on the basis of technology and location. At the same time, the enterprises
that are members of this scheme must meet several important criteria:
• They should have a stable financial base;
• They should produce a large share of the total volume of forest products in the Krai;
• They should (as a rule) be operating a “closed circle” production, including both
wood harvesting and wood processing; and
• They should own a large share (more than 25%) of all establishments in the branch
and be willing to follow agreed-upon financial, market and investment policies.
Since 1992, the transition in the Krasnoyarsk economy, the forming of a market
infrastructure and mechanisms characteristic of a market economy, has caused problems
for the region’s forest industry, according to the Department of Forest Industry of the
Krai Administration. At the beginning of 1993, a Committee for the Development of the
Forest Industrial Complex (Komitet po razvitiiu lesopromyshlennogo compleksa) was
formed within the Krasnoyarsk Administration. This committee elaborated a Krai
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Program for Reconstruction of the Forest Industrial Complex in order to reorganize the
forest enterprise sector and to stimulate investments. However, the program was
discontinued in 1997 due to lack of funding. In 1998, with the coming of the new
governor (Alexander Lebed) the committee was reorganized to become the Department
of Forest Industry (Upravlenie lesnoi promyshlennosti). An analysis of the current
status in the Krasnoyarsk forest sector performed by this committee showed that the
situation is critical. Accounts payable by the forest enterprises exceed their accounts
receivable by three times. Seventy-five percent of all forest sector enterprises are
unprofitable. Experience has shown that bankruptcy processes only cause the loss of all
property, when the basic assets of the enterprise are sold out.
This problem has begun to be solved in Krasnoyarsk by a fast readjustment among the
enterprises. This process often includes the establishment of new enterprises based on
the old ones. The assets of the old enterprise are then transferred as an investment to the
newly formed company. Thereby, the new company has no debts and a new owner. This
means that the old enterprise — by owing shares in the new enterprise — now has a real
source for paying off its debts. The new enterprise with no debts becomes attractive for
investors. An example of this procedure is the newly founded JSC “Igarski Seaport”. Its
shares belong to JSC “Igarski Forest Industrial Complex” which has lifted off the
accounts payable.
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Figure 3:2. The Krasnoyarsk forest complex. (Source: The scheme of management, coordination and regulation of activity of
the Krasnoyarsk forest complex enterprises, Krasnoyarsk Krai Administration, 1997).
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4. The Socioeconomic Situation in the Krasnoyarsk
Forest Sector
The Population and the Social Sphere
Demographic situation
In 1997, the population of Krasnoyarsk Krai (excluding autonomous regions) was
slightly over 3 million people. Of these 3 million, about 2.3 million (74.1%) lived in
urban areas, while close to 0.8 million (25.9%) lived in rural areas. About 88 percent of
the population were Russians. The population density in the region is much lower than
in European parts of the country, 4.2 inh./km2.
The natural population change (the birth-mortality relation) indicates that the
demographic situation in the region is problematic. Since 1993, falling birth rates and
continuous high mortality have caused a natural population decrease in the region (cf.
Table 4:1).
Table 4:1. Natural Population Change in Krasnoyarsk Krai, 1991–1996 (1,000 inh.).
Years
Coefficients
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Krai 13.0 11.4 10.0 10.4 9.8 9.4Birth-rate
Russia 12.1 10.7 9.4 9.6 9.3 8.9
Krai 9.8 11.0 13.5 14.9 13.9 13.2Death-rate
Russia 11.4 12.2 14.5 15.7 0.5 14.2
Krai 3.2 0.4 -3.5 -4.5 -4.1 -3.8Natural increase
Russia 0.7 -1.5 -5.1 -6.1 -5.7 -5.3
Source: Based on data of the Krasnoyarsk Sanitary and Epidemiological Inspectors Center.
Preceding this negative tendency, in the first half of the 1980s, favorable birth rates
were reached through improved government support for families with children. In this
period the highest birth rate was reached in 1986, when 56,566 children were born in
the region. This is the highest number ever during the last 20 years.
The long period of birth rate decline has made the process of population aging
practically irreversible. The decrease of the proportion of children under 14 years of age
in the total population of the region, from 25.5 percent in 1991 to 22.4 percent in 1996,
as well as the steady increase in the number of people older than 60 years — their
proportion of total population increased from 12.1 percent in 1991 to 13.1 percent in
1996 — has made the age structure of the population a “far-gone process of aging” in
the words of the Sverdlovsk governor E. Rossel. This will certainly lead to further
population decreases (Goskomekologiia Krasnoyarsk, 1997).
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Infant mortality, the level of which is often taken as an indicator of the health and social
prosperity of a society, continues to increase in Krasnoyarsk Krai, exceeding the
average for Russia as a whole (Goskomekologiia Krasnoyarsk, 1998).
The structure and total mortality in the region and the main causes of death are similar
to the Russian averages and to those for Siberia. The main causes of death are blood
circulation diseases, followed by accidents, traumatism, and poisonings. The third most
common cause of death is malignant cancers, the fourth — diseases of the respiratory
organs (cf. Table 4:2).
Table 4:2. Deaths in Krasnoyarsk Krai and Russia by causes, 1991–1996.
Number of deaths per 100,000 inhabitants
Causes of death
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Russia
1995
Total number of
    deaths including: 977.6 1103.8 1350.7 1485.5 1395.1 1326.8 -
Diseases of blood
   circulation system 458.1 523.4 623.0 706.2 649.2 646.6 790.1
Accidents, traumas,
   poisonings: 154.1 194.1 245.9 288.9 275.3 245.5 236.6
  - alcoholic poisonings 5.7 10.2 18.5 42.4 32.9 32.0 -
  - suicides 28.1 31.7 39.0 45.4 46.2 42.3 -
  - murders 23.0 33.8 40.7 45.4 42.0 32.8 -
Malignant growths 173.2 171.4 178.5 181.7 181.2 179.3 202.8
Diseases of respiration
   organs 49.3 57.6 75.8 84.4 75.5 66.8 73.9
Diseases of digestive
   organs 28.7 37.3 48.9 57.6 58.7 58.8 -
Infectious and
   parasitic diseases 17.8 20.7 28.0 32.9 29.4 29.6 -
Source: Based on data of the Krasnoyarsk Sanitary and Epidemiological Inspectors Center.
Deaths among the population in working age cause special concern. In 1994, 44.7
percent of all who died in Krasnoyarsk belonged to this age (Goskomekologiia
Krasnoyarsk, 1997).
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Table 4:3. Life expectancy of the population of Krasnoyarsk Krai (years).
Year Sex Krasnoyarsk Krai Russia
Men 60.0 63.4
Women 68.4 74.31991
Both sexes 64.3 69.0
Men - 62.0
Women - 73.71992
Both sexes - 67.9
Men 55.1 58.9
Women 66.1 71.91993
Both sexes 60.3 65.2
Men 53.9 58.9
Women 65.4 72.01994
Both sexes 59.2 64.3
Men 55.4 58.0
Women 66.6 72.01995
Both sexes 60.7 65.0
Men 56.0 58.9
Women 68.6 72.11996
Both sexes 61.9 65.2
Source: Based on the State Committee of Environmental Protection of Krasnoyarsk Krai, 1997.
Due to these negative tendencies of health and demographic factors, average life
expectancy, which is often seen as an indicator of the health status in a society, reached
its minimum level in 1993, 59.2 years (53.9 for men). In 1996, life expectancy had
improved again to 61.2 years, but it still lagged behind the Russian average by 3.3 years
(Table 4:3). Thus, the negative demographic development in Krasnoyarsk Krai
continues. The main way of improving the situation is to lower mortality due to
infections, accidents and poisonings.
Research and development in the Krasnoyarsk forest sector
As of 1January 1996, 64,700 people (or 4.7% of the total workforce) worked in the
Krasnoyarsk forest industrial complex. As mentioned earlier, some 53,300 people work
in the forest industy, including 1,440 highly qualified engineers and specialists.
The Krasnoyarsk Forest Management employs 5,183 people, including 4,462 people
who are paid over the state budget. (The Krasnoyarsk Forest Management is the
regional body of the Federal Forest Service of the Russian Federation — the central
authority responsible for forest management and protection.) Of the total number of
people employed by the Regional Forest Management 1,589 people work as managers
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and specialists, including 580 people with higher education, 879 with special secondary
education, and 130 people (8.2%) are workers.
Training of personnel for work in the Krasnoyarsk forest complex is offered by the
following special secondary schools and universities: the Dvinogorsk Leskhoz-
Technical School, the Kansk Technological School, the Krasnoyarsk College of Wood
Working Industry, the Siberian State Technological University, the Institute for Further
Professional Forestry Training for Siberia and the Far East (in the town of Divnogorsk),
and the Krasnoyarsk Institute for Further Professional Training of Key Personnel and
Specialists for the Forest and Pulp and Paper Industry.
Table 4:4. Number of graduates of various faculties of forestry and forest industrial
educational establishments in Krasnoyarsk Krai, 1998.
Name of educational establishment (faculty) Number ofgraduates
Divnogorsk Leskhoz-Technical School
   Economics of forestry and aesthetic forestry 60
   Economics, business accounting and control in the forest sector 34
Krasnoyarsk Wood Working Technical School*
   Processing technology, economics and planning 23
   Wood working technology, economics and planning 47
Krasnoyarsk State Technological Academy**
   Economics of forestry and aesthetic forestry 169
   Technology of chemical wood processing 49
   Wood processing technology 86
   Forest mechanical engineering 79
   Machinery and equipment for the forest industrial complex 29
   Economics and management of forest industrial enterprises 72
   Business and auditing 86
Sum total 734
* In 1999 transformed (renamed) to Krasnoyarsk College of Wood Working Industry.
** In 1999 transformed (renamed) into the Siberian State Technological University.
Source: Data provided Krasnoyarsk Forest Management.
Training of employees in the forest sector was traditionally focused on the production
process rather than on solving market problems and business management. Of late this
situation has improved owing to the introduction of specialist training in the field of
market economics and management. Table 4:4 provides data on the training of forest
specialists by some faculties and departments of forest technical schools in Krasnoyarsk
in 1998.
The Krasnoyarsk Forest Management has elaborated a program for improving
professional skills by annually training a specified number of specialists at the Institute
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for Further Professional Forestry Training for Siberia and the Far East. These courses
run over five years. Annual seminars for forestry specialists are arranged at the institute.
In 1998, some 330 specialists participated in training at the institute.
Forest protection specialists improve their skills at the Divnogorsk Leskhoz-Technical
School.
V.N. Sukachev Institute of Forest of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of
Sciences (SIB-RAS), well known for its forestry related research, is active in training
leskhoz personnel in remote sensing and GIS. There are also GIS specialists at the
Krasnoyarsk Technical University, the Siberian State Technological University, the
Technological Center of GIS of SIB-RAS, as well as at the Inter-highschool Center of
Informational Technologies for training of students.
Wages and employment in the Krasnoyarsk forest sector
The main social problems in the forest sector and other branches of the Krasnoyarsk
economy are related to unemployment and wage arrears. According to data from the
Krasnoyarsk Committee of State Statistics, 69,400 people were unemployed in the Krai
in March 1999. According to official data of the Forest Industry Administration the
existing unemployment level in different branches of the economy varied between 2.57
and 10.89 percent as of 1 April 1997. Officially, the number of unemployed in the forest
sector was 245–1,973 people.
According to official data unemployment in the country reached 12.4% at the end of
March (9 million people). By the year 2000 every seventh Russian may be out of job
(Rossiiskaia Gazeta, No. 81–82, 28 April 1999).
During the last few years there was a sharp employment decrease in the forest industrial
complex. But the rate of decrease was even greater in the production output of the
complex, indicating an even greater decrease in productivity. The forest industrial sector
has experienced the most rapid employment decrease among all branches of heavy
industry (Sokolov, 1998).
The average monthly salary is the basis on which consumer budgets are formed for
people working in the forest sector. Traditionally, workers in the forest sector have been
underpaid and salaries in the sector have had a tendency to lag behind other branches of
the economy. According to data from the Krasnoyarsk Forest Management the monthly
salary in forestry was 578,000 rubles in 1997 (Table 4:5). Salaries only covered 49.5
percent of the costs of living. Compared with the average wage in industry as a whole
wages in the forest industrial complex decreased from 85.3 percent of the average in
1991 to 49.1 percent in 1996. This year, average wages in the forest industrial complex
was 5–700,000 rubles. Simultaneously, wage arrears are constant. Wages are often paid
out in consumer goods, which are usually expensive but of low quality.
Under such circumstances the importance of other means of subsistence increases.
People grow vegetables in their gardens, they fish, hunt, etc. People earning their entire
living by such activities related to the forest number around 5,000.
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Table 4:5. Purchasing power in Russia’s regions in 1997 (Number of minimum survival
product baskets per person bought with an average monthly salary).
City of Moscow 9.02
Murmansk Oblast 2.61
Republic of Karelia 2.56
Krasnoyarsk Krai 2.36
Tomsk Oblast 2.14
Irkutsk Oblast 2.05
Arkhangelsk Oblast 1.65
Khabarovsk Krai 1.61
Moscow Oblast 1.56
Source: Balzer, 1998:175.
Sixty percent of the inhabitants in Krasnoyarsk have their own gardens or dachas. The
income from activities based on these gardens and datchas was estimated to be 17
percent of total family income in the 1980s. According to a recent inquiry inhabitants of
lespromkhozy get at least 50 percent of their means of living from the secondary
economy (at least if they own a cow) (Vladyshevskii et al., 1998).
The economic and judicial status of aboriginal peoples in the
Krasnoyarsk forest sector
As a result of historical processes three groups of people have formed on the territory of
Krasnoyarsk Krai: 1) small aboriginal peoples, 2) migrants from other parts of Russia
who came to stay permanently, and 3) migrants who came for a period to work and earn
money. The first of these groups has experienced a constant decrease both in absolute
and relative size. According to data from the Committee on State Statistics the size of
the aboriginal population in the Krai has decreased by 15 percent since 1959. Today,
there are 14,800 people belonging to this group. In this period, however, the Russian
population increased by 16 percent (Goskomstat Krasnoyarsk, 1996). In the competition
for the use of more valuable and accessible forests the aboriginal peoples have had to
cede to the Russian migrants.
Presently 219 Evenks live on the area of the Krai Forest Fund (apart from those who
live in the Evenk National Okrug). There are 319 Selcupes and 734 Ketos.
According to existing legislation regulating hunting and fishing, the aboriginal peoples
have some privileges, particularly concerning fishing of valuable species. According to
the new Russian Forest Code, the interests of aboriginal peoples must be taken into
account in forest leasing and other forms of forest utilization. The situation for
aboriginal peoples has always been a declared priority for the Soviet power and it has
continued to be so in the new Russia.
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On 12 May 1999, the federal law “On guarantees of rights of aboriginal small peoples of
the Russian Federation” was enforced. For the first time the legal regulation of problems
of vital importance for aboriginal small peoples was guaranteed (Rossiiskaia Gazeta, No.
90, 12 May 1999).
Legislative regulations, however, never improved the conditions of life and did not help
maintain the culture of the aboriginal population in the region. The unfavorable
economic situation of the aborigines has further deteriorated because of their rigid social
behavior. And one should keep in mind that there was always a large difference
between actual and declared equality of different nationalities in the Soviet Union
(Vladyshevskii et al., 1998). As heads of most administrative structures, the Russian
migrants guaranteed a more favorable regime for their fellow Russians, offering them
better hunting areas as well as paying better for their products. Even if it was officially
forbidden to offer alcohol to aborigines, drinking always played a role on one level or
another when it came to cheaply acquiring high quality hunting grounds.
Presently, in order to improve their situation, land has been given for free to the
aborigines: 2.5 million ha of Forest Fund lands belonging to Norilsk was allocated to
the aborigines for hunting and fishing. Unfortunately, when the demand for natural
products is decreasing the allocation of lands might not have any positive results.
The forest utilization by the aboriginal population cannot produce negative
environmental consequences and resource exhaustion. Furthermore, increasing
transportation costs have restricted the use of remote forests by all groups in society and
such forests have become animal reserves.
Forestry
According to Article 19 of the Russian Forest Code the Forest Fund is federal property.
However, transfer of the Forest Fund to the property of the so-called Subjects of the
Federation is allowed according to federal legislation.
Forest management in Krasnoyarsk Krai is the responsibility of Krasnoyarsk Forest
Management, which is subordinated both to the Federal Forest Service of Russia and to
the Krasnoyarsk Krai Administration. The federal budget is the main source of
expediture on forest management. The regional budget finances reforestation measures.
Land use taxes and timber lease charges go both to the federal budget and to the budget
of the Subjects of the Federation. It should be noted that this way some of the forest
income that goes into the federal and regional budgets is used for other purposes than
forest management.
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Diagram 4:1. Share of internal funds in the total expenditure of the Krasnoyarsk forest
management (Source: Krasnoyarsk Forest Management, 1997).
Diagram 4:1 shows the extent to which forest management measures are funded by the
revenues from the commercial activities of the leskhozy themselves. Obviously the
leskhozy have learned to cope better and better with this task. In 1997 they were even
left with a “profit” after all forest management activities were paid for.
In 1990, the yearly total average expenditure per hectare of forest area in East Siberia
amounted to 0.212 rubles, of which 0.113 rubles were operational costs. This sum is not
enough even for ordinary forest regeneration. Calculations for some of the leskhozy in
the region have shown that one should spend between 1–10 rubles/ha (in 1990 prices) of
forest area in order to maintain the forest in a satisfactory condition (Sokolov et al.,
1994).
As the chairman of the Krasnoyarsk Forest Management, Vladimir Vekshin, said in an
interview: “Foresters have been instructed to manage the forest resources of our Krai, but
neither federal nor local authorities meet their obligations and give us the necessary funds
for doing so. Therefore, the harvesting capacity of the leskhozy has steadily increased
through various cutting methods and foresters have already become the major loggers in
the region. Practically half of the leskhoz income comes from the sales of commercial
wood. Penalties and forfeits together make up the remaining quarter of total income”
(Krasnoiarskii Rabochii, No. 4, 1999).
According to materials of the regional Forest Management harvesting sites with a total
wood volume of 7.6 million m3 were examined (Goskomekologiia Krasnoyarsk, 1998).
Exposed forest offences decreased compared to 1996. So, for instance, there was a 10
percent decrease in destroying growth and young forests, a more than 24 percent
decrease in left areas uncleared from slash, and a 16 percent decrease in the felling of
debris. The volumes of harvested wood left on the cutting sites decreased by over 40
percent, while the volumes of unbarked wood left for the summer period diminished by
35.5 percent. Forest offenders were to pay 36.1 billion rubles forfeits for revealed
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offences of Wood Delivery Rules (cf. Diagram 4:2). On average in the region, total
fines per cubic meter of harvested wood amounted to 4,750 rubles.
Fines
37%
Auxiliary 
benefits 
9%
Sales of forest 
products
25%
Other services
16%
Stumpage
13%
Diagram 4:2. Origin of incomes of the Krasnoyarsk Leskhozy in 1996, Percent
(Source: Krasnoyarsk Forest Management, 1996).
The annual decrease in the exposed forest offences is explained by the reduction of
forest exploitation capacity and the strengthening of state control of the loggers’
maintenance of nature protection technology used on harvesting sites.
The extent of clear cutting has been decreasing in the period 1992–1997. In fact, in
1997, intermediate cutting was only performed on an area of 12,700 ha. The only task
performed in full was selective sanitary cutting, which was performed on a total area of
5,600 ha. This is related to the shrinking funding of forest preservation, the difficulty to
sell small volumes of commercial wood from intermediate cutting and a deterioration of
the material and technical provision of leskhozy.
Cluttering up forests with slash, the predominance of very fire prone coniferous stands
(83% of the total forest area) and the existence of large areas of young coniferous stands
result in a systematically increased danger of fire. An active forest fire defense
protection covers 43 million ha, more than 38 million of which are surveyed from the
air. Satellite monitoring covers 38 million ha.
During the fire danger period of 1997 there were 870 forest fires covering close to
110,000 ha of Forest Fund lands. In addition, close to 97,000 ha were damaged. The
losses caused by forest fires in the region amounted to 153 billion rubles, and some 2.2
billion m3 of wood were burnt. The cost per ha of burnt area amounted to 132,800
rubles, including 66,000 rubles for fire extinction. The total costs for forest fire
protection in 1997 were estimated to be close to 13 billion rubles, including almost 7.4
billion rubles to extinguish wild fires. The leskhozy paid 5.5 billion rubles for these fire
preventing measures from their own resources. Only 7.6 billion rubles were received
from the federal budget to compensate for the total costs of fire fighting.
Since forest pests and diseases are spreading in the region a forest pathological study as
well as disease extinction measures are urgently needed. In 1997, forest pathological
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monitoring covering 844,200 ha of forest lands was performed by the leskhozy. The
large-scale air-chemical and air-bacteriological treatments of 554,200 ha of forest stands
that were covered in 1995–1997 did not save large forest areas. About 135,800 ha of
forests damaged by the Siberian gypsy moth were reclassified from stocked lands to
unstocked lands (Krasnoyarsk Forest Management, 1997). Stands damaged by fires,
pests and industrial pollution as well as large windfall areas and an irrational utilization
of harvesting areas have caused an unsatisfactory sanitary state of the Krasnoyarsk
forests. Forest users rarely take the trouble to create favorable conditions for
reforestation following final harvesting (Goskomekologiia Krasnoyarsk, 1998).
According to the Forest Fund Account of 1 January 1998, there are 1.8 million ha of
forest lands in need of reforestation. Of this area close to 190,000 ha should be naturally
regenerated, some 400,000 ha should receive assisted natural regeneration, and close to
405,000 ha should be regenerated through planting. The forest cultural fund (the area
accessible for economic use) covers 132,600 ha of this area. Forest culture production
has shown a clear decreasing tendency these last few years. In 1997, actual forest
regeneration capacity in the region was only 69,900 ha, including 9,300 ha for forest
culture production. The capacity for forest culture work has decreased by about 40
percent compared to 1993. The main reason for the decrease these last few years is the
lack of funding. Furthermore, forest cultures have been destroyed. For instance, forest
cultures on an area of 2,000 ha (21.5% of their planting area) were written off. Close to
2,000 ha were damaged by fires and 100 ha were damaged by wild animals and rodents.
All in all, the volume of reforestation exceeded the volume of harvesting and
destruction by 62,700 ha in 1997. The efficiency of forest regenerative work is
measured by the annual increase of young coniferous stands. In Krasnoyarsk Krai the
areas of such stands increased from 2.6 million ha in 1993 to 2.8 million ha in 1997.
This tendency warrants some hope for an improved forest fund structure in the future.
Harvesting and Processing of Wood
Harvesting volumes in the Krai have decreased sharply during the last years. It was
close to 7.4 million m3 in 1997. This is only 29.5 percent of the volumes of 1988, when
about 25 million m3 were harvested (Table 4:6).
During the last six years the total harvested volume of commercial wood in the region
was 55.9 million m3. The volume of harvested firewood was 14.7 million m3.
In the whole region 5.2 million ha were leased for harvesting, containing an Annual
Allowable Cut (AAC) limit of 11.4 million m3. In 1996, 82 plots with a total area of 4.4
million ha were leased for harvesting. One should note that from an AAC of 9.7 million
m
3
 only 1.2 million m3 were actually harvested by the lease holders in 1996.
Existing AAC levels are largely overestimated, since calculations are often not based on
the “hard data” provided by forest accounts. The systematic error amounts to at least
10–15 percent. Less than 30 percent of the Siberian forests have been investigated with
ground methods. Remaining areas were studied in the 1940s and 1950s using relatively
uncertain areal methods. According to Sukhikh (1989) growing stocks were then
overestimated by 1.2–1.5 times. Nevertheless, these data have been used at every
periodic revision of the Forest Fund.
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Table 4:6. Use of the annual allowable cut in the Krasnoyarsk in 1992–1997.
Indexes 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Actual volume of
   cutting , 1,000 m3 15757.8 12805.4 8420.0 9044.0 7599.3 7374.3
of which coniferous
   forestry, 1,000 m3 13972.5 11944.5 8063.0 8681.9 7269.1 7098.0
Change 1992-1997, % -5.6 -18.7 -34.2 +7.7 -16.0 -3.0
Annual allowable cut,
   1,000 m3 56384.0 56384.0 52085.4 51572.4 52902.8 53122.4
Including coniferous
   forestry, 1,000 m3 36605.4 36605.4 32073.2 31630.9 32021.4 32197.2
Use of annual
   allowable cut, % 27.9 22.7 16.2 17.5 14.4 13.8
Source: Based on data of the Krasnoyarsk Forest Management.
The Nigneye Priangara area of the Angara-Yenisei region has been the main harvesting
area of the Krai for the last 10 years. This is an area of 26.8 million ha. About 65
percent of all harvesting in Krasnoyarsk is made in this area. In 1993, when total
harvesting in the Krai was 12.8 million m3, it was 8.3 million m3 in the Nigneye
Priangara area. The AAC in the area is 32.8 million m3 or 63 percent of the total AAC in
the Krai. However, recently the AAC of the Nigneye Priangara area has been used to
only 17 percent on average. For coniferous forests the share is 24 percent.
Harvesting methods depend on natural conditions. In most cases tree-length harvesting
is used rather than the so-called assortment method. Analyses show that crosscutting at
the upper landing as well as handmade assortment methods are the most efficient at
clear-cutting. Waste volumes then averages 5 percent (according to data provided by the
Krasnoyarsk Forest Management).
The main harvested tree species are pine, fir, spruce and larch. In 1996, the share of
various species in total harvesting is shown in Diagram 4:3.
Production in the forest industrial complex of Krasnoyarsk Krai began to fall in 1990.
Since 1992, the transition towards a market economy has resulted in a deterioration of
enterprise performance and most of the enterprises in the region went into an economic
crisis. Due to the general economic situation in the country timber and paper production
volumes decreased by 50–66 percent in the period 1989–1995, sawn timber volumes
were reduced below the level of 1950, paper and paperboard to the level of 1965 (Table
4:7).
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Diagram 4:3. Distribution of main harvested tree species, Percent (Source: Based on
data of the Department of Forest Industry of Krasnoyarsk Krai).
Table 4:7. Forest commodity output in Krasnoyarsk Krai, 1991–1996 (Current Prices).
Product 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Round timber, million m3 14.0 11.6 8.8 6.4 6.4 5.4
Billion rubles 1.1 10.4 72.5 194.9 558.7 760.3
Lumber, million m3 4.0 3.1 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.6
Billion rubles 1.0 15.7 97.6 195.8 629.8 660.0
Market cellulose, 1,000 tons 13.6 11.3 8.9 4.8 5.4 -
Billion rubles 0.02 0.2 0.9 3.5 14.1 18.0
Paper, 1,000 tons 99.4 77 55.9 41.9 52.4 50.2
Billion rubles 0.2 1.1 5.5 30.9 136.3 173.1
Cardboard, million m2 823.2 654.4 432.2 334.3 575.9 394.2
Billion rubles 0.2 1.4 6.3 36.5 207.6 201.1
Fiberboard, million m2 26.5 26.0 27.3 28.0 37.4 37.5
Billion rubles 0.02 0.4 2.3 10.7 63.3 65.9
Furniture, billion rubles 0.2 2.4 18.1 43.1 100.5 174.8
Source: Data provided by the Department of Forest Industry of Krasnoyarsk Krai.
According to data from the Krasnoyarsk Committee of State Statistics for the period
January–March 1999, sleeper production decreased by 60 percent, while roundwood
and sawn timber production decreased by 8.8 and 19.4 percent respectively, compared
to the same period in 1998.
Total furniture and fiberboard production increased somewhat due to increases in
production capacities. A new technique to produce lumber and furniture boards from
massive wood was introduced. This production was competitive on the world market.
For example, the largest wood processing plant in the region, “Lesosibirskiy LDK”,
which produces sawn timber and board, is exporting 73 percent of its products to
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countries in Western Europe and North Africa.3 Small private enterprises have also
appeared that are mainly specializing in meeting demands from the population.
After a long drop, culminating in September 1998, life has again come back to the
Russian industry. In March 1999, production volumes in the forest, wood processing and
pulp and paper industry increased by 7.5 percent. The increase in exports of pulp, paper,
paperboard, and plywood as well as the development of furniture production, wallpaper,
and paper products replacing imports have played a decisive role here (Rossiiskaia
gazeta, No. l8, 8 May 1999).
But still, the state of the market, the systematic rise of railway and sea transport tariffs,
and the cost of electric energy make the situation serious and renders even the most
competitive forest export production unprofitable.
Transportation
Historical analysis of the forest exploitation in Krasnoyarsk Krai, which has the largest
forest reserves in the country, reveals that, depending on accessibility, it is only about
40 percent of the forests that can be considered as an economic resource.4 Vast areas of
natural ecosystems in the north of the region remain untapped to this day. However,
huge forest areas along railways in the southern parts of the region suffered severely
from clear-cutting in the 1950–1970s. In the future, the areas suitable for harvesting will
undoubtedly become smaller, due to the tendency to use only the best forests, due to
ecological restrictions, but also due to the weakly developed regional transport
infrastructure. (See map of Krasnoyarsk Krai on page 8.)
The total length of all kinds of ground transport roads in Krasnoyarsk is 36,701 km.
This number includes 763 km railways, 6,054 km automobile roads with hard surface,
24,557 km dirt roads. Roads used all year round have a total length of 9,689 km, while
there are 5,327 km winter roads (according to data provided by the Department of
Forest Industry of Krasnoyarsk Krai Administration).
The density of roads suitable for transporting wood is 0.047 km/km2. On average wood
is transported about 100 km from the harvesting sites to the industrial processing
plants.5
During the ice-free period the largest rivers in the Krai (the Yenisei and Angara and
their tributaries) are used for floating of large volumes of wood. Harvesting and rafting
is performed by lespromkhozy in the Boguchany, Motygino and Yeniseisk districts. The
total volume of wood transported by rafting in 1997 was 1.7 million m3 and the total
length of rivers used for floating was 3,739 km (Goskomekologiia Krasnoyarsk, 1998).
                                               
3
 Information given in the author’s interview with the enterpise management on 19 November 1998.
4
 The analysis was provided by the Department of Forest Industry, Krasnoyarsk Krai Administration.
5
 Figure given by the Department of Forest Industry of Krasnoyarsk Krai Administration.
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The main floating methods used are rafting and bag booms. Despite a government
decision (No. 384 of 25 September 1997) “On stopping drift floating in rivers and other
water reservoirs of the Russian Federation” and the RSFSR Water Code some forest
harvesting enterprises still exercise drift floating. Such rule violations present a serious
problem, especially in small rivers in the region (Goskomekologiia Krasnoyarsk, 1998).
There are four seaports located in the north of the region — Dixon, Dudinka, Igarka and
Khatanga. The capacity of these ports has drastically decreased during the last few
years. For instance, at the end of the 1980s, around 2 million m3 of export sawn timber
was transported through Dudinka Seaport out via the North Sea Route. Today, the
volume has decreased to about 100,000 m3. The situation is similar in other seaports.
Until 1991, the Dixon Seaport belonged to the Murmansk Shipping Company, but
recently the company got rid of the port to decrease its losses. Although the port became
part of the Norilsk metallurgical group in 1994, the situation remains as difficult as it
used to be. Ten years ago the goods turnover at this port was 133,000 tons, presently it
is only about 20,000 tons (Krasnoiarskii rabochii, No. 74, 12 May 1999).
Transportation of forest products via the North Sea Route is not profitable due to the
extremely high ice-breaker charges, which may be up to USD 18 per ton of transported
goods.
“Earlier river transport workers used to transport up to 0.5–1 million m3, mainly from
mills belonging to Lesosibirsk,” says the general director of the Joint-Stock Company
“Yeniseysk River Steamship Line,” Ivan Bulava. “Until now we have only promises from
the Lesosibirsk LDK-1 about the transportation of 150,000 m3 sawn timber through the
seaport Igarka” (Krasnoiarskii Rabochii, No. 111, 19 June 1997).
The analysis of the future accessibility of forests in the region is complicated by the fact
that the sector is currently being radically restructured. The regimes under which
enterprises have so far been operating (input prices, transport costs, wage levels,
solvency requirements, etc.) are currently changing, resulting in an increase of unit
production costs. Between 1990 and 1995 (Diagram 4.4), the railway tariff, for
example, increased 15,910 times, the price of round timber increased 5,530 times,
sleepers 5,567 times (Sokolov, 1998).
In connection with the Decision of the Ministry of Communications in January 1999 to
cancel discounts for long-distance transportation, the Legislative Krai Assembly [the
reional Duma] has made a request to the Chairman of the Russian Federation
Government, Evgeny Primakov, to introduce acceptable tariffs for railway transportation
of sawn timber for export and to abolish custom duties for enterprises of the region
(Krasnoiarskii Rabochii, No. 65, 9 April 1999).
32


































5DLOZD\WDULIIV
)XHO
&RDO
7LPEHU
Diagram 4:4. Growth of railway tariffs and energy resources costs as compared with
timber costs (Source: Based on Sokolov, 1998).
The Minister of Communications, Nikolai Aksenenko, stated that price increases for
railway transportation would simply be “a blasphemous step” taking into account the
current solvency of the Russian population. Nevertheless, there are 24 federal laws
instituting 40 categories of people with special privileges, affecting more than 75 million
people (about 50% of the whole Russian population). This solution to the problem is
closely connected to the goods transport tariffs, since incomes from goods transportation
compensate the expenses at all levels (Izvestiia, No. 22, 22 April 1999).
The introduction of new high transport tariffs caused a rise of transport costs of forest
industrial enterprises selling their production to traditional customers in the central part
of Russia and on European markets. Many forest harvesting companies were not able to
obtain raw materials and went bankrupt.
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Forest Product Markets
One of the main reasons for the crisis of the forest industrial complex in Krasnoyarsk
Krai is the practically complete loss of traditional markets for the saw milling and wood
processing industry (Middle Asia, Kazakhstan, Transcaucasus, Northern Caucasus) as
well as the loss of the export market for sawn wood to the East European countries and
Cuba. The wood supply to these countries was regulated by the state on the basis of
clearing and barter (Diagram 4:5).
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Diagram 4:5. Structure and dynamics of forest product exports, Percent. (Source:
Based on data of the Department of Forest Industry of Krasnoyarsk Krai).
As was demonstrated at an OECD workshop on “Industrial Restructuring of the
Krasnoyarsk Krai” (held in Krasnoyarsk, 12–13 October 1995) regionally based
industries should have a tremendous opportunity to exploit a market of 3 million
consumers, who remain largely inaccessible for outside competitors because of huge
distances and high transportation costs (OECD/CCET, 1996).
The export share of the forest industry in the value of the region’s total export was only
4.7 percent as of 2 March 1999 (according to data of the Department of Forest Industry,
Krasnoyarsk Krai Administration).
Since 1994, there has been a steady increase in product supplies in the region. The
volume of saw timber export had increased by more than 3 times in 1995 compared to
1993 (from 54,400 to 168,000 m3), sawn timber by 30 percent (from 592,000 to 774,000
m
3). The increased exports in 1994–1995 did not compensate for the decrease in sawn
timber exports (which is the main forest export product in the Krai) in the period 1991–
1993 (Diagram 4:6). In 1995, sawn timber exports reached only 50 percent of its
volume in 1990 (Benderskii et al., 1998c).
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Diagram 4:6. The region’s share in Russia’s gross output of the forest complex, Percent
(Source: Based on data of the Department of Forest Industry of Krasnoyarsk Krai).
The regional economy is heavily dependent upon raw materials exports. The region
exports up to USD 2.5 billion worth of goods per year. Little is reinvested in Siberia,
however, causing a general degradation of the regional economy (Governors Sample,
1999).
Taking the vast area of the region and the high transportation costs into account, one
easily realizes that the orientation towards a complex processing of wood, producing
value added in the forest industry is of fundamental importance. The enterprises in the
region do not make the best use of their potential capacities for forest industrial exports.
Outmoded equipment in the wood processing enterprises precludes any quality
improvements. Therefore, one can conclude that reconstruction is advisable for forest
exporting enterprises, since they have to extend their markets due to the fact that round
timber exports is getting less profitable. Transportation of round timber and sawn timber
to the borders of Russia and the Far Eastern seaports increases their production costs by
150 to 200 percent and more, which drastically reduces their competitiveness on the
world market.
According to forecasts made before the August 1998 crisis the total wood demand in
Krasnoyarsk will increase by 2.8 percent per year until 2010. The demand for pulpwood
will increase by 4.6 percent per year, the demand for paper by 4.3 percent, and for
veneer by 4.4 percent. The demand for sawn timber will only increase by 1.6 percent
per year (Department of Forest Industry, Krasnoyarsk Krai Administration).
Due to the sharp decrease in traditional wood markets Krasnoyarsk Krai will have to
develop a new regional market for forest products. Enlarging and modernizing the
transport network needed for wood export might play a vital role. This could be done in
many ways:
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• through the introduction of all-year-round navigation via the Northern Sea Route
which might open additional perspectives for exports from the Krai;
• through the establishment of new transport routes to China and Mongolia; and
• through a modernization of the Transsiberian Railway.
It is quite possible that the future main forest product markets of Krasnoyarsk Krai
might be located in the forest-poor regions of West Siberia. When Kazakhstan’s
economy picks up again it will probably have to import forest products from
Krasnoyarsk as it did earlier. Wood export via the Northern Sea Route and sales of
forest products to China and other countries in the Pacific region is quite feasible given
the potential competition from the Far East.
According to data of the Russian Federal government, Russia loses about 26 billion US
dollars per year due to imperfect expert assessments of the quantity, quality, and costs for
goods and raw materials to be exported. In a resolution by the Russian Federal govern-
ment “On the introduction of an expert assessment system for the quantity and quality of
exported materials” [the so-called ekspertiza], which was adopted this year, the Central-
Siberian Chamber of Commerce and Industry is given the right to perform this task in
Krasnoyarsk Krai. According to data provided by the experts (there are about 600 such
experts in the Krai) only 5 percent of the forest products exported has been assessed by
experts. Around 80–90 percent of the export currency earned is “lost”6 in China, Japan,
South Korea (Krasnoiarskii Rabochii, No. 63, 6 April 1999).
Investments
Krasnoyarsk is a region rich in natural resources (non-ferrous metals, mineral energy
and wood). With its well-educated workforce, it is a region of great economic potential.
Investments in the region are determined, first of all, by the general political and
economic situation in Russia. Despite the “Complex Program of Stimulating Domestic
and Foreign Investments,” which was initiated on 13 October 1995 by the Russian
government, the situation still remains as unfavorable as before. The disintegration of
the banking system has drained cash from the economy: the regional economics
minister, Svyatoslav Petrushko, has estimated that, all in all, the August 1998 crash cost
the region USD 150 million. Any foreign investment that still trickles into Russia is
devoted to producing goods in the richer parts of the country, not in sparsely populated
Siberia (Russia…, 1999).
The Krasnoyarsk governor energetically seeks foreign investments for his region, and
often travels abroad to meet with potential partners. To make the region more attractive,
he is trying to impose more discipline on the region’s budget.
                                               
6
 In 1999, some 80–90 percent of the net proceeds from this trade was never accounted for in Russia. This
is done through a systematic underreporting of the price of exported goods, something that might be
avoided (or at least made more difficult) if the goods had to be subjected to expertiza, i.e., if the value of
export goods had to be assessed by experts. Evidently, illegal export from Russia to certain countries is
widespread.
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However, the results have been meager so far. Japan’s Marubeni, which has long been
active in Krasnoyarsk, was the only major company to participate in Lebed’s
inauguration festivities. Moreover, at the end of 1998, Fitch ICBA gave the region a
worst rating, putting it on the red list. Presently, the Krai does not obtain any direct
investments from abroad (Governors Sample, 1999).
The problem of investment involving the forest industrial complex of the Krai is
determined by three different groups of reasons:
• National (federal) factors:  
All the macroeconomic factors, domestic and foreign political conditions (such as
inflation level, budget deficit, tax legislation, export-import balance, authority,
stability, etc.) are here.
• Industry-wide factors (specific for the forest industrial complex as a whole):
The most important problem in this field is the absence of a clear and generally used
mechanism for obtaining lands of the forest fund for long-term utilization (long term
lease and concession). No less than 10 acts are needed to be approved at the federal
level in order to establish a long term lease or concession.
• Regional factors specific for the forest industrial complex of the Krai:
(a) remoteness from foreign (both western and eastern) markets;
(b) weakly developed transport and technological infrastructure; and
(c) small number of forest sector enterprises that possess a sufficient capital, staff,
and infrastructure to attract serious investments.
A majority of the forest industrial enterprises in Krasnoyarsk already meet these
problems at the stage of preparing business plans. The problems of giving investor
guarantees are hardest to solve today.
An imperfect system of managing forest industrial enterprises in the region causes
problems hampering capital formation and the efficient use of capital. These problems
mainly consist in the absence of real economic monitoring and planning at the
enterprise level, as well as insufficiently developed marketing which might promote
sales in the market.
A financial analysis of the Krasnoyarsk forest sector shows the following (Benderskii et
al., 1998b). For the period 1992–1996 investments in the regional forest sector declined
both relatively and absolutely. This was reflected in the decreased number of workers,
in poor financial results, etc., for the sector. The “barterization” of all financial relations
both within the forest complex and with partners outside the complex is of special
importance. This resulted in a narrowing of the active market and a reduction of the
financial relations. Calculations of the Institute of Economics and the Organization of
Industrial Production of SB RAS indicate that the amount of money channeled through
banks to regional budgets decreases by 0.4 percent when the number of barter
agreements increases by 1 percent. The direct financing of harvesting enterprises by
wood processing companies constitutes a new approach to the settlement of economic
relations in the sector. This can be seen as an example of “backward integration” as a
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solution to the problem of input procurement in the forest industry (Carlsson, Lundgren
and Olsson, 2000).
Analyses of the distribution of incomes and costs between the forest sector enterprises
seem to indicate that the use of relatively low raw material prices leads to a
redistribution of a value added to the processing branches (Benderskii et al., 1998b)
Such practice distorts the structure of value creation and hampers the reproductive
possibilities of the harvesting enterprises, that constitute the initial stage of the forest
industrial cycle.
Thus, in order to achieve a sustainable forest utilization in the Krai one has to pay
special attention to the allocation of investments to profitable processing enterprises that
produce a high value added and have a stable and solvent demand. This would mean a
concentration on woodworking products, such as particle board and furniture, products
of the pulp and paper and forest chemical industries, etc. Otherwise, the forest complex
will not be able to fully finance forest regenerative and productivity increasing
measures. It is also necessary to approve a regional legislation that might facilitate the
formation of an efficient and stable basis for financial, taxation and tariff regulation to
the benefit of forest investors.
Taxation System
Statistics tells us that the quantity of natural resources used per unit of production is
between 2 and 8 times larger in Russia compared to developed countries. This is not
only decreasing the competitiveness of Russian products — it causes irreparable
damages for the economy. The “Plan for Russian Natural Resource Use” approved by
the government on 2 August 1997 (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2 August 1997) envisages the
establishment of a natural resource management system, the stimulation of modern
technologies, the regulation of raw materials export, provisions for resource
reproduction, changes in the forest legislation and other key regulations. Improving
economic methods, including the tax system, is of the highest priority for an efficient
nature management aiming at a sustainable forest utilization.
Compared to world averages, stumpage in Russia is too low. The cost of one cubic
meter of growing stock was 6,000 rubles in 1996–1997. This is less than 2–3 percent of
the average output value realized in the forest industry (Benderskii et al., 1998a)
Profits from leasing forest lands for different use were not fully realized (Table 4:8).
Leaseholders — this primarily concerns harvesting — could not pay the rent for the
annual allowable cut, since this greatly exceeds the total stumpage fees for the wood
that might actually be harvested (Department of Forest Industry, Krasnoyarsk Krai
Administration).
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Table 4:8 Information about leasing.
Volume of harvested
timber in 1999, 1,000 m3
Forms of forest
fund use
Number
of leased
parcels
Area
1,000 ha
Annual
allowable
cut
1,000 m3 Sum total
Including
coniferous
forests
Harvesting 95 5211.2 11387.6 1152.8 1082.8
Minor forest
   products 1 0.006 - - -
Hunting 330 36904.8 - - -
Research aims 1 42.3 - - -
Cultural and
   recreation aims 4 0.5 - - -
Total 431 42158.8 11387.6 1152.8 1082.8
Source: Provided by the Department of Forest Industry of the Krasnoyarsk Krai.
The current Russian taxation system gives large privileges to forestry compared to the
forest industry. According to the changes and supplements to the tax legislation
approved by the government on April 27, 1994, No. 8 of instruction No. 4 “On the
procedure of calculating and paying profit tax to the budget by enterprises and
organizations” the following incomes by the leskhozy are not subject to taxation:
• income obtained from processing and utilization of low-grade and small commercial
wood;
• income obtained from intermediate cutting; and
• income obtained from the realization of non-wood forest products on condition that
this income be used for forest management.
Overall, there are 26,000 enterprises in Krasnoyarsk, yet 80 percent of the region’s
income comes from taxes assessed on only 9 percent of them (Avramov, 1998).
In the economic program before the election the Krasnoyarsk governor Lebed stressed
that the Krai’s key problems are: a shrinking tax base, real money tax income that
comprises only 38.6 percent of the Krai’s overall income, regionally set taxes that are too
high. To remedy these problems he called for bringing the region’s large enterprises back
to life, developing medium and small business, and increasing the flow of real money
into the budget. (Economicheskaia programma kandidata na dolzhnost’ gubernatora
Krasnoiarskogo Kraiia Aleksandra Ivanovicha Lebedia,
URL: http: www.alebed.org/win/index.htms/ELPROG/)
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According to a presidential decree (of 1 January 1995) leskhozy are exempt from profit
tax if profits are used for financing forestry activities. In addition, no tax is levied on:
• The fixed assets of the leskhoz;
• The use of motor roads;
• The purchase of forest maintenance machinery (transport fund);
• Sale of forestry services (from the value-added tax); and
• The sales turnover of sanitary cuttings (for wood used as input in processing and for
other needs in the enterprise performing the cutting).
The leskhozy pay the following taxes:
• Social taxes based on the wage fund (38.5%);
• Transportation tax; and
• Income tax (12%).
Official registration of the tax base in Russia began in 1998. One should note the “non-
ecological” profile of the Russian tax system. Thus, if the aggregate profit tax rate was
35 percent, payment for the utilization of natural resources was only 2.8 percent
(Benderskii et al., 1998a).
The State Duma has approved the Federal law “Changes and supplements to the Federal
Law on ‘Profit tax of enterprises and organizations’.” This law envisages a five percent
decrease of profit tax from enterprises and organizations. As Sergey Shtorgin from the
Duma Budget Committee said: “According to the law the rate of profit tax from enter-
prises and organizations, being enlisted to the Federal Budget, is set at 11 percent” (the
law will come into effect on 1 April 1999). He also said that profit taxes (including tax
paid by foreign juridical persons) are included into the budgets of the Subjects of the
Russian Federation according to rates set by the legislative organs of these subjects, at
maximum 19 percent (Krasnoiarskii rabochii, No. 48, 16 March 1999).
A number of payments, which are obligatory in the production of other raw materials,
do not apply to the forest sector. About 40 percent of state taxes collected in
Krasnoyarsk originate from producers of forest products. All in all, taxes constitute
slightly over 20 percent of the primary cost of forest products (Table 4:9). This way,
through the transfer of taxes, the regions become donors to the federal budget.
Furthermore, the current taxation system significantly affects the economy of the sector
(Nash krai, No. 1, 15 April 1999).
Vladimir Pashkov, auditor at the Russian Federation Accounting chamber, said that 28
taxes would remain in Russia when the Tax Code had come into full effect. He also said
that there are 48 taxes in Russia today. Four of them are taxes to non-budget funds and in
some Russian regions there are in fact up to 100 different taxes (Krasnoiarskii rabochii,
No. 38, 4 March 1999).
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Table 4:9 Structure of taxation in cost price of forest processing in Krasnoyarsk Krai,
Percent.
Type of tax Amount and collector Tax base % of unitprice
Forest tax 5% of commercial forest:
   federal budget – 2%,
   regional budget  – 1%,
   local budget – 2%
Gross output 7.2
3.0
1.2
3.0
Transport tax 3.1% of commercial forest:
   federal budget  – 0.4%,
   local budget – 2.7%
Gross output 4.29
0.29
4.00
Payments to the pension
   fund
28% of the wage fund:
   local budget – 28%
Wage fund 6.6
6.6
Payments to the social
   security fund
5.4% of wage fund:
   federal budget – 0.324%
   regional budget – 0.216%
   local budget – 4.86%
Wage fund 1.26
0.08
0.05
1.14
Payments to the
   employment fund
1.5% of wage fund:
   federal budget – 0.09%
   regional budget – 0.06%
   local budget – 1.05%
Wage fund 0.35
0.02
0.08
0.25
Payments to the
  obligatory medical
  insurance fund
3.6% of wage fund:
   federal budget – 0.2%
   regional budget – 0.16%
   local budget – 3.24%
Wage fund 0.84
0.05
0.04
0.76
Transport tax 1% of wage fund:
   local budget – 1%
Wage fund 0.23
0.23
Total share of taxes in the cost price of commercial forest 20.7
Input costs 45.5
Wage fund 23.4
Amortization 10.4
Total cost price 100.0
Source: Based on Benderskii et al., 1998a.
Measures to introduce tax reductions in cases when contributions are made for
improvements of degraded habitats or for regenerating resources for endangered species
deserve attention. So does the issue of equating income from forest regenerating work
with income from capital growth, and the study of the possibilities to use credits for
nature protection purposes as a market mechanism for environmental protection.
The privileges of exporters compensating them for value-added tax is kept. In sawmills,
costs of materials and overhead expenses amount to 68.6 percent of total production
costs. Consequently, the value-added tax actually paid by such enterprises will amount
to 6.9 percent of their total production costs (taking into account a value-added tax of 22
percent according to the draft Tax Code), and in relation to the price of the product it
will amount to 6.46 percent.
Proposals envisaging a growth in labor productivity also remain privileged from a
taxation point of view.
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Apparently the tax privileges of small business enterprises will also remain.
In essence, it seems that the Tax Code stipulates that the forest management organs
should take responsibility for the growth of income from forest use. This will stimulate
development, economic growth and investments in the forest sector.
5. Political Profile and the Forest Sector
Regional Politics
Only 41 percent of the population took part in the last election to the Legislative
Assembly of Krasnoyarsk Krai in December 1997. The following “voting blocks”
received more than the five percent of the votes which gives them a mandate in the
assembly:
• Communists and Agrarians for People’s Power (Kommunisty i agrarii za vlast’
naroda);
• Honor and Motherland. A. Lebed (Chest’ i rodina);
• Union of the Cause and Order — the Future of the Krai (Soiuz dela i poriadka —
budushchee kraia); and
• Yabloko Union (Ob”edinenie “Iabloko”).
It could also be noted that around 6 percent of the votes were against the whole list.
The Communist Party received the most votes (21.1%) compared to the “Honor and
Motherland” block (13.6%). The “Yabloko” Union candidates were only given a small
share of the votes (7.5%). It can also be observed that the voting block “Union of the
Cause and Order” consisting of independent candidates with no affiliation to any
political party received 12.9 percent of the votes (Krasnoiarskii rabochii, No. 237, 9
December 1997). A number of well-known and respectable people in the region
belonged to this voting block, such as the major of the City of Krasnoyarsk, the general
director of the Norilsk metallurgical holding, the editor-in-chief of the TV company
“Afontovo”, the chief producer of the Krasnoyarsk Dramatic Theater, the head
physician of the Krasnoyarsk Emergency Hospital, the coach of the well-known sports
team “Yenisei” (multiple winner of the Russian hockey tournaments), and others. The
candidates of this block presented their own programs — strategies for a regional
development in Krasnoyarsk Krai containing proposals for regional laws and state
programs. Election results from one-mandate districts show that the “Union of the
Cause and Order” candidates took 10 of 41 seats. One of the candidates belonging to
this block was elected chairman of the regional legislative assembly.
The Communist Party candidates got nine seats in the legislative assembly. This made
the communists the largest group in the regional duma. The “Honor and Motherland”
got eight representatives elected. Four businessmen were elected as independent
candidates. The Yaboloko Union got two deputies in the assembly, one candidate of the
voting block “World War II Veterans” as well as a candidate of the union “Doctors and
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Teachers for Social Guarantees and Justice” were both elected members of the
legislative assembly (Krasnoiarskii rabochii, No. 246, 26 December 1997).
Thus, about half of the elected deputies represent non-party social and economic
structures. Only one deputy, a communist, the former head of the Siberian Academy of
Technology, Vladislav Sevostianov, represents the interests of the forest sector. This
demonstrates the virtual non-existence of a forest lobby in the region.
The election of governor in April 1998 displayed the weak position of the Communist
Party. The communist candidate did not get to the second election round. He only
received around 13 percent of the votes.
The first election round immediately showed that there were only two serious
contenders for the post of governor — the acting governor, the democrat Valery Zubov,
and the former secretary of the Russian Security Council, the leader of the “Honor and
Motherland” party, general Alexander Lebed. The latter eventually received 10 percent
more votes than his rival.
More than 60 percent of the population participated in the elections for a new governor.
Close to 3 percent of the votes were not given to any candidate. Most people, especially
in the countryside, preferred a change in power. This decision shows the people’s
discontent — a discontent aimed against Moscow’s predatory policy. People understood
that a strong political power was needed in addition to — and even instead of — the
economic doctrines of the former governor Valery Zubov (Krasnoiarskii rabochii, No.
80, 28 April 1998).
In the second round of the elections in May 1998, Lebed was elected governor of
Krasnoyarsk Krai by 57.2 percent of the voters. Some 3.4 percent voted against both
candidates.
The beginning of May 1999 saw a fierce struggle among the regional politicians. The
most spectacular “bargain” during the current electoral period was an agreement
between Alexander Lebed and the leaders of the local Communist Party about a
strategic partnership in the December State Duma elections. Thus, the formal political
leaders of the region combined their efforts to meet the real opposition — the candidates
of the party “Otchizna”, the “Yabloko Union” and independent candidates (Krasno-
iarskii rabochii, No. 92, 19 May 1998).
Impeachment for Governor Lebed?
It should be noted that Alexander Lebed was elected governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai with
the help of financial support from magnates of the Russian aluminum business and the
bank “Rossiiskii kredit”. Some claim that the most active financial support for Lebed
was provided by the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Krasnoyarsk Aluminum
Plant, the independent deputy of the Krasnoyarsk Legislative Assembly, Anatoly Bykov
(Rossiiskaia gazeta, 26 January 1999). The former governor Valery Zubov was not a
suitable political figure from the aluminum business’ point of view. With his support
the Moscow based financial group “Alfa” began to operate more actively in the region.
In particular, Alfa gained control over the Achinsk Alum Earth Plant, which is a part of
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the technological chain of the Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant. This meant that resources
were diverted from the region.
Some months after the governor election an intensive discussion about the conflict
between the governor and representatives of the regional production elite began in mass
media. In March 1999, during consultations with Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov and
the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Alexander Lebed asked
for help in his “fight against the Krai criminal structures”, which, according to Lebed,
are led by Anatoly Bykov, the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Krasnoyarsk
Aluminum Plant. Some days later a special commission of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs headed by the first Deputy Minister, general-colonel Vladimir Kolesnikov
arrived in Krasnoyarsk.
Answering the questions of journalists about the goals of the federal commission sent to
Krasnoyarsk, the head of the Russian Federation presidential administration, Nikolay
Bordyuzha, said that, according to information known to him, a very complicated and
intricate criminal situation had arisen in Krasnoyarsk Krai, and this situation should be
investigated. However, according to many observers, the level of specialists in the
commission was too high. Possibly, the real goals of the control were wider and more
serious (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 12 March 1999).
The reasons for the conflict is reported differently in Krasnoyarsk and in Moscow. In
Krasnoyarsk people are displeased with the “strange general-governor” during whose
term in power life has become harder. As the former Representative of the Russian
President in Krasnoyarsk Krai, Yuri Mokvich, said: “When the ex-governor Valery
Zubov went from his post the budget sector wage arrears were 2.5 months. After the
August crisis profits of the local enterprises increased sharply since 43 percent of their
production was exported. But why have the wage arrears become larger, up to 4.5
months at present?”
In Moscow, Lebed’s version of the events is given more attention. According to this
version the opposition against the governor from “the Krai criminal structures” is
constantly growing. The governor tries to get some regional enterprises in the coal and
energy complex to be managed by the Krai administration.
At a meeting of the Siberian Accord interregional association on 15 January 1999, Lebed
said that the federal government should transfer ownership of factories, electricity
generators and coal mines to the regions, giving the regional leadership significantly
greater freedom from Moscow. Lebed proposed to subordinate the “approximately 90”
regional branches of federal ministries working in the Krai to both the governor and the
federal government. They are currently only subordinated to the federal government.
Lebed warned that attempts by the center to strengthen its ties to the regions would only
increase separatist tendencies. Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov responded, saying “we
lost the Soviet Union, we are not going to lose Russia,” and warned against such
separatism (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 January 1999).
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As opposed to his idea, there is a proposal from regional industrialists suggesting the
foundation of a united power-metallurgical corporation integrating the production chain
“coal–energy resources–metallurgy”. In their opinion this would greatly reduce
production costs.
Lately, both sides in the conflict made several harsh statements. According to Lebed the
Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant gets energy at highly “understated tariffs.” “Bykov’s
people” from the Krasnoyarsk energy complex do not wish to raise the energy tariff.
The local power specialists, in their turn, add the argument that all relations with the
Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant are based on agreements which corresponded to existing
legislation and the tariff was determined by decisions of the regional energy
commission.
In Krasnoyarsk Krai the average tariff for electrical energy is 16.17 kopeks per 1 kwh. It
is set at 17.32 kopeks for industrial enterprises and 8 kopeks for the Krai population. It is
a rather low tariff in Russia, since a lower tariff is only to be found in Khakassia (90%
hydropower) and in Irkutsk (70% hydropower). For example, in St. Petersburg the
average tariff for electric energy is 29 kopeks, in Moscow and Volgograd it is 28 kopeks.
Despite the low tariff in the Krai the debts to the power system reached 2,387 million
rubles as of 19 October 1998 (Krasnoiarskii rabochii, No. 151, 22 October 1998).
Nevertheless, the regional Public Prosecutor’s Office has started a criminal process
against the illegal agreement between the Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant and the
Krasnoyarsk energy complex. According to preliminary estimates the damage caused
would amount to 2,859 billion rubles. According to the latest opinion polls the support
for the Krasnoyarsk governor has decreased by almost 50 percent compared with the
summer of 1998. Under these circumstances the decision by the Legislative Assembly
to start an impeachment procedure against the governor is understandable (Krasnoiarski
rabochii, No. 55, 26 March 1999).
To evaluate the situation in the region it is necessary to take the many different
economic and political interests of the governor into account. General Lebed is a very
tough politician with the specific goal of strengthening his economic and political
influence. Many believe that he has presidential ambitions. Surely the possession of the
region’s energy complex will allow him to control many neighboring regions that get
their coal and electricity from Krasnoyarsk. The events which currently take place in the
Krai seem to be a further step towards the forming of Lebed’s political and economic
initiative.
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6. Institutional Problems and Shortcomings
Forest Legislation and Forest Management Strategy
According to Article 1 of the Forest Code of the Russian Federation, the forest
legislation of Russia consists of the Forest Code, federal laws and other normative acts
of the Russian Federation. The regulation given in other normative acts must not
contradict the Russian forest legislation.
More than 100 laws and acts concerning forest resources, their protection, regeneration
and utilization were in effect before the Russian Forest Code was adopted in 1997, and
they are still in effect today. At the same time, the number of forest enterprises has
grown dramatically (Sokolov et al., 1998).
The “Principles of Forest Legislation of the Russian Federation” were adopted on 6
March 1993. Here there was some progress compared to the forest legislation of 1978.
For instance, it was recognized that the forest fund is under the joint authority of the
Russian Federation and its subjects. The competence of the Russian Federation, its
subjects, and the institutions of local government in regulating forest relations is
determined in a more rigid way. A non-budget fund for reforestation and forest
protection was founded to improve forestry financing. Some new items were included,
such as antimonopoly demands, lease of forest fund parcels, forest monitoring
(Principles, 1993).
The new forest legislation adopted in 1997 (Forest Code, 1997) did not improve on the
earlier Principles of Forest Legislation. For instance, the Forest Code does not consider
the following factors:
• Different forms of forest ownership;
• The organization of state forest management;
• The character of relations between the federation and its subjects and regions;
• The financing of forestry measures; and
• The strategy of forest utilization and the economic relations between forest owners
and forest users.
According to the Forest Code all Russian forests are federal property. Thus, the Forest
Code contradicts what is said about forest ownership in the Constitution of the Russian
Federation. It also contradicts the Law on Natural Resources, where various forms of
ownership of land and natural resources are foreseen.
The uncertainty concerning forest ownership has led to an irresponsible adoption and
implementation of state policies and strategies in the recent past. It has also meant that
higher state organs has not always been following the forest legislation, leading to large-
scale plundering of forest resources and a lack of interest among forest workers in
increasing the profits from forest use. Since the forests are national property, the
property of all people, they belong to everybody and no one.
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In recent years, due to the state forest ownership monopoly, a paradoxical situation has
appeared where mature, exploitable forests, which should contain the maximum volume
growing stock, be of high quality and of large economic value, are in a worse condition
in every respect than younger forests. Forests, which have been submitted to intensive
“tending” measures, have been destroyed through cleaning and sanitary cutting when
the most valuable trees were cut rather than the least valuable, diseased and damaged
trees. This wood was given away free of charge as worthless wood in exchange for
consumer goods. Our interviews with leskhoz representatives confirm this behavior.
Wood obtained through sanitary cutting provided major incomes for most leskhozy.
As the deputy governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai, Alexandra Kulenkova, said: “We have a
federal structure — the Forest Management. This Management has tens of leskhozy. And
these leskhozy cut the best export wood under the pretence of sanitary felling, they sell it
and try not to pay taxes under various pretexts. The existing hard line of management
from Moscow to the ordinary enterprise makes appropriation of forest incomes from the
region possible” (Nash krai, No. 1, 15 April 1999).
Unqualified forest planting causes great economic losses. In many cases forest
management is only simulated. In reality, however, there is no — or only an
unsystematic — improvement of the forest composition, the age structure of stands,
productivity increases, the marketability and profitability of forestry (Karpov, 1991;
1992).
Our interviews show that the practice of insufficient budget funding does not allow any
normal forestry measures but forces the State Forest Protection workers out to other
subsidiary works in order to procure money for financing the prescribed forestry
measures.
To develop a finance mechanism that could procure sufficient funds for reforestation,
forest tending and protection, forest regulation, forest science, the maintenance of forest
management and forestry organizations based on the forest income is a most
challenging task. Here it is essential not to infringe upon anybody’s interests. It is a
concern for subordinate forestry organizations (such as the leskhozy), for the
regional/local authorities as well as of federal state interest. One leskhoz director said in
our interview that one cannot expect a mutual interest and care for the State Forest
Production without increased forest utilization. Correspondingly, forest organizations
and local/regional authorities should be interested in raising forest incomes, in
intensifying forest utilization and reforestation.
There is a need for a compromise allowing forest income to be used not only for
local/regional non-forest needs, but also for forestry purposes, to regenerate forests, to
found a state non-budget fund for regeneration, to protect forests at the federal level and
in the Subjects of the Federation.
It should be noted that forestry planning as well as forest accounting and management in
Siberia are performed within the boundaries of economic-administrative units (leskhozy)
and not in accordance with requirements raised by the inherent order of forestry work.
This has created conditions that allow the existing variation between different forestry
organizations and types of management to be ignored. Furthermore, the age class
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method of forest management leads to an overcentralization in forestry planning. This
method is based on the principle “from the general to the particular,” which has already
come into conflict with contemporary demands on forest organization and management
in Siberia. Therefore, even with normal functioning funding, all defects in the existing
forest management system could not be eliminated.
The problem of cutting age and allowable cut is an example of the above. Forestry
incurs great losses due to the fact that the term “cutting age” has been substituted for
“cutting cycle,” where “cutting age” is equal to mature stand age. Moreover, cutting
ages are determined by order from above for the whole Siberian territory, without any
consideration for variations in specific conditions and economic purposes. All of this,
together with the imperfect method for calculating annual allowable cut (AAC), as well
as ignoring the environmental and economic accessibility of the forest resources,
inevitably results in an overestimation of reserves and a risk for exhaustion of the
forests (Sokolov, 1997).
Isaev et al. (1995) have noted that the changes occurring in Russia open unprecedented
possibilities for developing production capacities and, at the same time, these changes
present a danger for the preservation of the natural environment and the forest cover.
With the existing system of forest organization and management the forester is not
allowed to become the thrifty master who knows the nature of the forest. On the
contrary, he is likely to become an insignificant part in a cumbersome and rigid forest
management system.
A System of Forest Relations
What might be called the “system of forest relations” significantly influences the
sustainability of forest exploitation. It radically influences the protection of the forests,
forest utilization and reforestation. According to the Forest Code of the Russian
Federation (mainly through the Federal Forest Service), the Subjects of the Federation,
municipal administrations, and juridical persons are all agents in this system of forest
relations.
Analyzing problems related to the system of forest relations one has to discriminate
between at least three major categories of actors, which influence processes taking place
in the forest sector:
• organs of forest management;
• forest users; and
• agents operating on the market and providing services to the forest complex.
Such an approach will facilitate efficient decisions about investments, since the forest
complex will only function and develop well if the work of these three agents is
coordinated.
The specific conditions of most forest areas are such that an efficient exploitation can,
as a rule, only be realized within territorial areas under a united forest complex
combining the natural resource (the forest), industrial and social objects (settlements,
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roads, communications, productive capacities, etc.), and the people living and working
in the areas.
A forest area can only be a basis for a sustainable combination of enterprises,
organizations and individuals if there is a unified complex plan for the exploitation of
the area, which is elaborated with a view to keep and regenerate the available resources.
Such an approach might solve the problem of varying cost-effectiveness in forest
utilization between different forest plots within the same forest area, since both high and
low productivity plots should be offered for long-term lease (Koropachinskii and
Sokolov, 1998).
The problem of forest lease is of central importance. The present practice of forest lease
does not sufficiently reflect the interests of the leaseholders and it does not serve
economic development, neither in harvesting nor in forest management. One negative
feature of the current lease regulations in Russia is its bias in favor of potentially large
harvesting capacities that supports an extensive forest management (where quantity
dominates over quality requirements). Ideally, there should be a logical, economic
relation between product costs, rent values, growing stock price and stumpage fees. A
decisive factor for determining the economy of forest lease is to offer the forest fund
parcel to the disposal of the leaseholder as private property, giving the leaseholder the
possibility to use his leased lands as security for loans, have it officially registered and
using it in support of contracts for sales of output. Such leasing arrangements would
give the enterprise an opportunity to obtain circulating assets which are very important
for its economic development.
The absence of such rules has already resulted in a situation where large quantities of
the best wood goes to the market, primarily to the export market, in the form of raw
materials, while at the same time, processing plants in the region cannot find a sufficient
amount of wood due to the regional enterprises’ insufficient ability to pay (World Bank,
1997).
These current processes do not promote further wood processing at the local level, since
resource losses at harvesting and processing sites do not stimulate the establishment of
new workplaces, do not help solving social problems and protecting the interests of
indigenous peoples.
Furthermore, adequate leasing rules would provide better conditions for developing
small private enterprises, creating a competitive regime actively stimulating increased
labor productivity. Such conditions would entail the provision of basic production
services, such as:
• the leasing and servicing of machinery;
• the establishment of functioning input and output markets;
• provision of transport and communication services;
• provision of engineering and consultancy services; and
• the building of infrastructure, such as roads, communication links, etc., or the
establishment of appropriate branch organizations.
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General Problems Besetting the Krasnoyarsk Forest Enterprises
The forest sector — the forestries, the harvesting and processing industries — is
significantly influencing living standards and promoting the functioning and
development of the most important branches of industry, construction, and
transportation. The share of the forest industrial complex in the total Russian industrial
production was 5.1 percent in 1995. The forest industrial complex contains more than
30,000 enterprises with a total number of 2.2 million workers. Like the Russian
economy in general the forest industrial complex is in a difficult economic, technical
and social crisis, and it has been so for a long time already. Production of the main
kinds of paper products decreased in the period 1988–1995 by 50–65 percent on the
average, wood harvesting and transporting decreased to the level of 1935, sawn wood
volumes are lower than in 1950, paper and paperboard was reduced to the level of 1965
(Goskomstat Rossii, 1995).
According to calculations by the World Bank the fall of the Russian economy will reach
8.3 percent, and inflation will be 60 percent in 1999 (Rossiiskaia gazeta, No. 16, 24 April
1999).
The forest industrial enterprises in Russia are currently in a critical financial situation.
There is an increasing number of unprofitable enterprises likely to go bankrupt. There
have been no large investments made in the Russian forest sector since the end of the
1980s (World Bank, 1997). The absence of investments has caused a sharp reduction in
the number of operating harvesting enterprises in recent years. It has also led to an
underutilization and aging of wood processing enterprises. The depreciation of main
capital assets in the complex as a whole has exceeded 50 percent (Sokolov, 1998). In
combination with poor technical service (or no service at all) the depreciation has
resulted in decreased quality of the main capital with simultaneously increased negative
environmental effects due to sewage spills and decreased labor safety. The dismantling
of the state social security system has left the employees of the forest complex with
weak occupational protection.
There are large unused resources in intermediary forest utilization due to the low
intensity of cleaning and sanitary cuttings. Only 12 percent have been used of the 140
million m3 that is allowed by the forest inventory (lesoustroistvo) for intermediary forest
utilization in accordance with silvicultural requirements.
Only during the last few years has a market infrastructure begun to be formed for the
forest industrial complex of the country. The first signs of true competition have
appeared, the mechanism of demand and supply has begun to operate. At the same time,
the crisis keeps causing a deterioration in the work of enterprises. In 1994, enterprises
belonging to the forest industrial complex produced a total output worth 13.3 trillion
rubles. The production volume decreased by 31.2 percent in comparison with 1993
(Goskomstat Rossii, 1994).
This situation depends on many factors. Most forest industrial enterprises have a social
responsibility and the work has a seasonal character, which puts great strains on their
financial situation, especially under the current economic conditions with its increasing
prices for fuel, energy resources and transportation.
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The enterprises’ financial situation is negatively affected by inflation, payment arrears
and also by the extremely imperfect taxation policy. Taxes have been sizably increased
(mainly due to the introduction of new forest taxes) and there are a number of branch-
specific circumstances, such as the technological need for large log storages due to the
seasonality of harvesting, the interdependence of forestry related subindustries, and the
geographical location of the forests that play a significant role in this context. Currency
gains from the export of paper products have been reduced. Russia has lost forest
markets and prestige on the world arena.
The management of the forest industrial complex has practically been destroyed at all
levels. Technological, production, cooperative links and relations, which were
developed over many years, have now been broken. The present structure of the Russian
forest industrial production is imperfect and does not match the level of developed
countries. Products of mechanical wood processing dominate and the level of chemical
and chemical-mechanical wood processing is far from satisfactory: in Russia it amounts
to 33 percent of total forest production, compared with 60–65 percent in progressive
developed countries (World Bank, 1997).
In leading forest countries the export of paper products contributes a large part of the
national income. For example, in Finland, 87 percent of all paper and paperboard
produced is exported, as is 80 percent of all veneer produced, 56 percent of sawn wood,
and some 33 percent of wooden boards. Similarly, in Sweden, Canada and the USA,
large shares of produced wood products are exported. In Russia, only 3–5 percent of
produced paper is sold abroad (Sokolov, 1998).
A profitably working forest industrial complex constitutes the economic basis for
sustainable forest use, for performing complex regenerative, protective, and ecological
measures as well as research activities. Without going into any detail of the concepts
and models of sustainable forest utilization that exist in industrially developed countries
of the world one can easily identify some of the specific features of the Russian
conditions.
The forest industrial complex of Russia was built in the period of centralized economic
management and its recent rapid production fall and the break-down of all supply and
demand links are due to the fact that:
• the main forests are found far away (in Siberia, the Far East) from facilities for
further wood processing (pulp and paper factories, wood board and furniture
manufacturers), which were located in sparsely forested areas (like the Central
European part of Russia, Middle Asia) for the purpose of developing these areas and
the artificial cooperation of the Soviet republics;
• the scale and type of investments made by the State was dictated not by the market,
but by the plan; and
• the forest industrial complex suffered greatly from the fast privatization, the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the introduction of market-set prices, and the price increases of
transportation.
The socioeconomic standard of life of employees in the forest industrial complex has
deteriorated. Before 1993, the average salary in the forest industry was more or less on
the same level as other branches of the economy. In 1994, the average monthly salary in
the forest industrial complex was more than 73 percent below that of the gas industry
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and almost 55 percent below the level of the coal industry. Today this difference is even
larger (Vladyshevskii et al., 1998).
The provision of housing for the people working in the forest industry is poor.
Moreover, living conditions are poor, especially in small forest settlements. All
industrial enterprises, and especially forest enterprises, are heavily burdened by the
social sphere since they are the sole supporters of forest settlements and their
infrastructure.
If this negative process is not stopped then production will continue to drop by 50–60
percent compared to the present level during the next 2–3 years. Then the Russian forest
industrial complex will be practically destroyed with very problematic consequences for
a large number of industries and people in the country (Sokolov, 1998).
Most pulp and paper and wood processing plants as well as harvesting companies
(lespromkhozy) have social responsibilities. When production falls or the enterprises are
closed down unemployment inevitably appears. According to estimates, unemployment
in the forest industry may reach 500,000 people (or about 30% of total employment) in
the next 2–3 years if no counter-measures are taken. In this case, government
expenditure for unemployment alone would amount to 1.5 billion rubles. Expenditures
will rise even further if people have to move to other places. When the floating
enterprises were closed down, some 1.3 billion rubles were needed to move people from
the floater settlements. The close-down of large pulp and paper industries with its town
infrastructure can have unforeseen consequences.
The rich renewable forest resources, the high level of research, the production and
technical potential of the forest sector, the large domestic and foreign markets together
open great opportunities for Russia to develop an advanced forest industrial complex
with a potential to lift the national economy to its proper level of socioeconomic
development.
All of what has been said above about the Russian forest sector is entirely relevant also
for Krasnoyarsk Krai. Here, the situation is furthermore aggravated by the fact that the
total value of commodity output per ha of forest land for the region’s wood production
is only 33–56 percent of corresponding value in the forest regions of the European part
of Russia and as much as 50–80 percent lower than in Finland.
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Diagram 6:1. Production of commercial wood and sawn timber in Krasnoyarsk Krai
1989–1995 (Source: based on Sokolov, 1998).
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The forest products shipped out of the region are mainly sawn goods (the most valuable
product) and round timber (the least valuable product) which have a low value added in
relation to raw material costs. This leads to a diminishing source of incomes for
reforestation, forest protective and other measures guaranteeing a sustainable forest
utilization (which is not depending on the size of forest taxes levied by the State).
Total costs per ruble of commodity output increases constantly as do the wage arrears.
The average monthly wages in the forest industrial complex in the Krai is only 55
percent of that of the whole industry as of 1 January 1996 (according to information
provided by the Department of Forest Industry of the Krasnoyarsk Administration).
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Diagram 6:2. Labor productivity in the Krasnoyarsk forest industry, m3 per employee
(Source: Based on Sokolov, 1998).
The crisis in the forest sector has appreciably affected other segments of the forest
industrial complex as well as all other linked branches of the national economy. The
supply of sawn wood to the regional wood processing plants decreased due to exports
from the region. Many loggers wish to found their own sawmilling enterprise and this
causes a loss of efficiency in the sector. As a result, sawn wood production in the Krai
has been reduced by about two thirds, including a decrease of sawn wood for export of
about 60 percent (Nash krai, No. 3, 14 May 1999).
In 1995 and early 1996, the production decrease slowed down, some stabilization began
due to the stable working of some enterprises and plants. Consequently, there seems to
be a chance that the situation in the regional forest industrial complex could stabilize
and even recover.
The main reasons for the current crisis in the Krasnoyarsk forest industrial complex are:
1. The badly premeditated and hasty privatization and the complete loss of state
management of enterprises belonging to the forest industrial complex both at the
federal and the regional level.
2. The reduced construction activities in the region (resulting in a decreased demand
for sawn wood, semi-finished products, etc.).
3. The almost complete loss of traditional markets for sawn wood and processed wood
products from the region (reduced demand from Middle Asia, Kazakhstan,
Transcaucasus, North Caucasus).
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4. The loss of the export market for sawn wood in the East-European countries and
Cuba, to which deliveries used to be regulated by the State on a barter clearing base.
5. Enterprise leaders’ lack of experience of working under the new market conditions
(assessing the market situation, knowledge of contractual relations, basic juridical
knowledge, pricing, banking, etc.). Such functions were earlier always performed by
state organs without any participation of the enterprise management.
6. The organization of the enterprises’ work under barter conditions, with many
mediators and “false firms” inside the enterprises themselves during the first reform
stage (1989–1994). This caused great losses for the enterprises due to asset
stripping. Income was spent on welfare for workers and other organizations rather
than on the development of production. During this period money could be obtained
on good conditions through the banks (which was also done by many “clever”
intermediary actors at the expense of the enterprises) and production could have
been modernized (Information provided by the Department of Forest Industry,
Krasnoyarsk Krai Administration). For example, an enterprise in the town of
Lesosibirsk installed new capacities for the production of fiberboard, furniture, and
furniture board from revenues of its barter trade.
7. Due to the government’s policy an irrepressible price increase on all goods and
services began, leading to artificial cost increases in forest enterprises when they
reduced production while at the same time keeping all workers and increasing
material costs. This process has not yet been brought under control by the Russian
government, the Krai Administration or the legislative bodies. Prices on most forest
products exceed world market prices. Therefore, even forest exporting enterprises
work at a loss, while low priced forest products are imported and sold on the
regional market.
8. Most forest enterprises are insolvent, due to the government’s policy of mutual
offsets, the great discount credit rates provided by the state and the imperfect tax
system.
9. There is a lack of management competence in most traditional forest enterprises
(whatever their ownership) under the new market conditions. Privatization in the
forest sector resulted in an uncontrolled situation, which gradually became almost
absurd. Most forest industrial leaders, especially leaders of closed joint-stock
companies (ZAOs), and of associations of limited responsibility (OOOs), did not
know how to stabilize production. Some enterprise leaders (owners) were
conservative. They thought that working well is not profitable because of the high
taxes. At the same time they founded new subsidiaries and strengthened in every
possible way the commercial structures that they had established earlier. They often
supported production and supplied these organizations with wood for export.
Sizable profits based on the work of the forest industry were accumulated in just
these subsidiary structures.
The Forest Code, through its provisions on long-term lease and concession, offered a
possibility for private forest users to take over several functions normally performed by
the Federal Forest Service. However, this process is only at an early stage of
development and the conditions for implementing it have not yet been elaborated. The
serious management problems still remain and have been further aggravated by the
economic crisis.
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Still only high quality and economically accessible raw materials are mainly used. This
strategy contradicts the long-term development goals of the forest industrial complex as
well as environmental requirements. As in other Russian regions the economic crisis
damaged the Krai’s forest sector earlier and more severely than it did other sectors of
the economy. Apart from the common reasons for the crisis a number of Krai specific
reasons for the fall in forest industrial production can be observed:
• industrial development was pursued only in the most accessible and productive
forests in the southern, central and eastern parts of the Krai;
• the environmental restrictions were more strict in Krasnoyarsk than elsewhere;
• there was a loss of real management of the forest sector (both in joint-stock
companies and in state enterprises);
• the fast inflation and the decreased competitiveness of forest products associated
with it causing sharp cost increases;
• the sharp reduction of the regional and all-Russian forest markets; and
• the region lost its position on the foreign market because of an inconsistent policy
regulating forest exports (currency corridor, extremely high transport tariffs, electric
energy tariffs, etc.).
7. Business Behavior
In this chapter an analysis of the behavior of a sample of forest firms in Krasnoyarsk is
presented. It is based on data collected through interviews with representatives of 25
forest enterprises in Krasnoyarsk Krai. The data on the Krasnoyarsk firms is compared
with data on 136 forest firms from six other Russian regions as well as 25 forest
enterprises in northern Sweden, which were part of the IIASA study.7
The Krasnoyarsk interviews were conducted in the period October 1998–March 1999. It
should be noted that we have tried to cover, at least partly, the whole territory of region.
Thus, our sample includes some interviews with harvesting companies in remote areas
of the Krai.
All interviewed enterprises were established long before the beginning of the transition
to the market. Our sample consists of 13 privatized firms, 11 state owned enterprises
and 1 municipal enterprise.
Classified according to type of activity we find the following groups of firms in our
sample: 8 forest owners/managers (leskhozy), 9 harvesting enterprises (lespromkhozy), 3
wood processing enterprises, and 3 firms engaged in combined activities, such as
harvesting/processing. The sample includes one wood rosin mill and one interview was
conducted with a representative of a research organization.
The selected firms can also be classified according to their size (number employees).
Table 7:1 shows the firms grouped into three categories, small enterprises having less
than 100 employees (8 firms), middle sized enterprises having up to 500 employees (12
                                               
7
 Cf. footnote 1.
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firms), and large enterprises, which are oriented towards wood processing and have
more than 500 employees (3 firms). The largest enterprise in our sample has 3,231
employees. It should be noted that middle sized and large old state enterprises dominate
our sample.
Table 7:1. The sample of Krasnoyarsk forest enterprises by number of employees.
Size of enterprises (number of employees)
Type of activity
less than 100 101–500 more than 500
Forest owner (leskhoz) 6 2
Harvesting (lespromkhoz) 1 6 1
Processing 4
Harvesting/processing 3
Turpentine production 1
Research 1
Productivity and Employment
As can be seen in Diagram 7:1, about half of the enterprises in our sample have had a
productivity decrease of more than 40 percent during the last five years, while “only”
around 20 percent of the 136 firms in the six other Russian regions experienced such
large productivity decreases. However, it should be noted that a rather large share of the
Krasnoyarsk firms (30%) increased their productivity compared with the rest of the
Russian firms in the study. In Diagram 7:2 the corresponding changes in employment is
depicted. During the last five years, 67 percent of the enterprises have drastically
reduced their number of employees and 29 percent of the enterprises in our sample
report a moderate decrease in employment. One interviewed firm reports that it has
increased its workforce.
However, about 33 percent of the Krasnoyarsk firms have been able to retain their
workforce and increase their productivity. Thus, it seems that these firms are
demonstrating a more market oriented behavior.
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Diagram 7:1. Productivity change in forest enterprises in Krasnoyarsk Krai, Russia,
and Sweden, 1993–1998.
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Diagram 7:2. Employment change in forest enterprises in Krasnoyarsk Krai, Russia,
and Sweden, 1993–1995.
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The Input Side of the Enterprise
There are 16 forest industrial enterprises in our sample. The majority of them (69%) get
their wood from the leskhozy, except for the wood rosin plant, which acquires its raw
materials from chemical leskhozy.8 Half of these enterprises lease their forest lands,
another part acquires the timber through purchases at preset stumpage fees. Only one
company uses both ways to acquire timber. Accordingly, the remaining enterprises,
which are large processing plants, acquire wood directly from harvesting companies
based on annual contracts. It can be noted that another special type of agreement also
exists: for one of these plants 65 percent of all inputs are processed on commission,
since the plant lacks funds to purchase their own wood.
As can be seen in Diagram 7:3, most of the firms (9 out of 16) cannot obtain a sufficient
amount of wood. When asked for the reason most of the respondents blamed the
financial situation, they simply did not have money enough to buy timber. One large
company reports that the harvesting enterprises had reduced their harvesting volume.
Our data also indicate that only 19 percent of the companies have alternative wood
suppliers. It is notable that these are large processing companies exporting their
products and making investments.
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Diagram 7:3. Wood supply.
                                               
8
 Khimleskhozy are chemical forestry enterprises that are engaged in resin boxing.
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More than half of the companies (56%) pay (at least to some extent) for their wood
supply before delivery (one respondent did not answer this question), while 75 percent
state that they pay on delivery. What is interesting here is that the same number (75%)
arrange their payments through the banks and 75 percent of all firms say that they are
engaged in barter. This indicates that a majority of the enterprises in Krasnoyarsk
arrange their financial transactions in several different ways. They also regard broken
agreements as a big problem when purchasing wood.
The Output Side of the Enterprise
As was already noted in the previous chapter one of the major problems of the
Krasnoyarsk forest sector is the lack of investments in production. In Diagram 7:4 it can
be seen that only about 30 percent of the interviewed firms invest. One could also note
that only three of these enterprises have commercial relations with a bank, and this is
mainly due to the fact that one enterprise exports its products and one is owned by the
business bank “SBS-AGRO”. A majority of the enterprises used their own funds for
investments. Respondents maintain that it is not possible to use the banking system due
to unacceptable lending terms.
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Diagram 7:4. Enterprises making investments.
As is shown in Diagram 7:5 only about 20 percent of the interviewed enterprises export
their products abroad, including the so-called “near-abroad countries”.
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Diagram 7:5. Enterprises exporting their products.
Most of the region’s forest exports to European countries originates in large enterprises.
Asked how a typical sales transaction is performed, the representative of such an
enterprise answered that all relations in foreign markets that the company had
established before Perestroika still worked. One should also note that the Krai has an
unfavorable location very far away from foreign markets.
Gaddy and Ickes (1998) characterize the current Russian crisis as “the notorious
‘nonpayment’ or ‘payment arrears’ crisis”. They have advanced a theory, according to
which a large number of Russian enterprises operate in a “virtual economy”. Citing a
report by P.A. Karpov, chairman of the Inter-Agency Balance-Sheet Commission
(issued in December 1997) Gaddy and Ickes claim that “[a]n economy is emerging
where prices are charged which no one pays in cash; where no one pays anything on
time; where huge mutual debts are created that also can’t be paid off in reasonable
periods of time; where wages are declared and not paid; and so on. [...] [This creates]
illusory, or virtual earnings, which in turn lead to unpaid, or virtual fiscal obligations,
[with business conducted at] nonmarket, or virtual prices” (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998).
As can be seen in Diagram 7:6, a majority of the enterprises sell their products through
barter. About 23 percent of the firms are paid in cash upon delivery, while 3 enterprises
get paid in cash before delivery. It should also be noted that none of them are paid after
delivery. It is evident that the arrangement of payments reflects a great lack of trust.
Accordingly, about 90 percent of all enterprises in Krasnoyarsk Krai regard broken
agreements as a big problem (two respondents did not answer this question).
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Diagram 7:6. Arrangement of selling payments among the Krasnoyarsk forest
enterprises.
Problems and Institutional Features
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the most common problems for the
Krasnoyarsk forest enterprises is related to the provision of social services. Our data
shows that about 80 percent of the forest enterprises in the region are engaged in the
provision of social services in one form or another (cf. Diagram 7:7). This could be
compared to the situation for the forest enterprises in six other Russian regions, where
45 percent of the enterprises have this obligation.
It should be noted that our sample mainly consists of middle sized and old large
enterprises. Such enterprises could also be expected to be more engaged in the provision
of social services, such as housing or consumer goods, to their employees.
To the question “Are there rules or regulations which are regarded as an obstacle for the
activities of the enterprises?” 15 enterprise representatives answered affirmatively (two
did not answer the question). The tax legislation, the financing system, barter, and
investment policy were most frequently mentioned by the enterprises as obstacles for
their business activities. It is evident that a majority of the Krasnoyarsk enterprises are
faced with a whole set of interrelated problems.
61
Social responsibilities yes/no
No answerNoYes
e
rc
en
t
100
80
60
40
20
0
REGION
Rest of Russia
Krasnoyarsk
Swedish companies
Diagram 7:7. Engagements and responsibilities related to the provision of social
services.
In our questionnaire enterprise representatives were asked about the single most binding
“restriction” on the activity of the enterprise. Table 7:2 shows their answers.
Table 7:2. Problems perceived as the most binding restriction for
operating forest enterprises in Krasnoyarsk Krai.
The most binding restriction for
operating the enterprises
Number of
enterprises
The general economic situation 8
The financial crisis 10
Transport costs and energy tariffs 5
Tax legislation 1
Other 1
No answer 1
Total 26
As can be seen in Table 7:2, most respondents regard the financial crisis and the general
economic situation as the main problem. Other answers concerning transport and energy
tariffs should probably also be seen as a reflection of the lack of financing.
The enterprises managers were also asked about what other factors they could identify
as obstacles for a successful business (cf. Diagram 7:8). Thirty-five percent of all
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Krasnoyarsk enterprises noted the problem of machinery/technology, while the Swedish
companies did not mention this issue at all. Moreover, it could be mentioned that skill
and competence, while regarded as a problem by 35 percent of the Swedish companies,
was considered a problem by only 5 percent of the Krasnoyarsk enterprises. Thus, it is
evident that problems often reflect the need of production re-equipment as well as
investments in general.
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Diagram 7:8. Other problems which enterprises regard as obstacles for
a successful business.
Asked about whether it would be possible to change anything in the Russian forest
sector, the forest enterprise representatives of Krasnoyarsk frequently mentioned the
problems of financing, banking, taxation, social responsibility, technology and equip-
ment. Two of the respondents would like to see changes in the forest policy and an
introduction of different forms of forest ownership. In our sample there was also a pro-
posal concerning the organization of the forest sector, suggesting the establishment of
complex forest management and harvesting enterprises. Finally, it should be noted that
three forest industrial leaders advocated the return to the system of state enterprise
management that existed before the transition to a market economy started. According
to Gaddy and Ickes (1998) “it is important to understand the continuity with the past.
[…] The Soviet economy appeared to be a large industrial economy. In fact, industry in
the Soviet economy was subsidized by under-priced raw materials and insufficient
charges for capital”.
Obviously, the different opinions of the forest enterprise representatives interviewed in
our survey on the transformation of the Russian forest sector reflect the complexity of
the general problems besetting the forest sector as well as the Russian economy as a
whole.
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8. Conclusions and Recommendations
Crisis Paradox
The instability of Russian forest policy negatively affects the state of the forest sector in
Krasnoyarsk Krai. No unified conception of structural reforms in the forest sector
existed at the beginning of the economic reform process. All structural changes were
influenced by the reduction of state investments, the break of existing economic links
between producers and consumers and other factors.
The forest raw material base of Siberia is seriously overestimated today. Most forests
have already been exploited resulting in large transformations — many primary forests
have been turned into secondary forests. However, on the whole, the forest resources are
still able to guarantee a sustainable multi-purpose forest exploitation in the region.
The fast decentralization of management in the Krasnoyarsk forest industrial complex
and the privatization of enterprises, which did not take the specific character of
production into account, led to serious negative results: a huge production fall and large
related socioeconomic losses. Furthermore, in connection with the general economic
crisis in the country the forest industrial sector of Krasnoyarsk Krai has experienced a
deep economic crisis.
To overcome the current problems it is first of all necessary to solve a number of issues
relating to:
• capital investments;
• the high tariffs for transporting finished forest products;
• the high costs of energy and energy carriers; and
• the organization of enterprise management.
These and other problems affecting the forest complex can only be solved in a process
of general economic and financial stabilization. On the other hand, the forest industrial
complex can greatly contribute to the economic development of Siberia and provide a
favorable regime for the solution of these problems.
Today, attracting investments is one of the most important components of an effective
forest policy. The frequent changes in the investment legislation, which, as a rule, were
poorly considered, do not promote an efficient investment regime. In a situation where
government activities do not play any important role for improving the investment
climate, there is an increased role and responsibility of the various subjects of the
Federation to attract investments, including foreign capital.
It may seem paradoxical, but the ongoing economic crisis also creates opportunities for
a radical change of forest exploitation methods, which will be needed in the future,
since the emergence from the crisis will inevitably be followed by a renovation of
production capacities. Thus, it will be possible to bring production in correspondence
with the environmental requirements of a sustainable forest management.
The current organization of Siberian forestry and forest management is far from
optimal. This is due to a number of factors, such as the overcentralization of forest
management, outdated forest inventory methods, deficient forestry financing, the
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peculiar character of forest relations related to current socioeconomic conditions and the
imperfect forest legislation.
In order to improve the organization of forestry and forest management it is necessary
to:
• thoroughly elaborate concrete silvicultural, economic, and technological tasks on the
basis of a careful analysis and assessment of the real forest resources, the rules for
forest utilization, the harvesting technologies and machinery that are required by
modern natural resource management, available transport modes, processing
technologies, sales opportunities, and the regeneration of forest resources;
• take the relation between federal, regional and local level partners in the forest
system into account, including the aboriginal populations;
• invent a mechanism for financing forestry, forest management, and research, which
is mainly based on forest income and reflects the interests of the regions; and
• take the interests of different forest users and leaseholders into account.
Forestry can only become efficient when the forest income increases, and this goal
cannot be reached without a multi-purpose sustainable forest utilization.
Recommendations
In this report we have presented our understanding of the problems facing the
Krasnoyarsk forest sector. Based on our analysis we would like to offer the following
recommendations for solving the problems discussed in previous parts of the report.
• It is necessary to elaborate an organizational structure for the regional forest sector
that meets contemporary requirements and that can help the sector out of its crisis
and facilitate efficient functioning under the new market relations.
• Project proposals should be developed and be applied in all parts of the region.
Projects should be aimed at technical re-equipment and modernization of the
sector’s enterprises in order to obtain new wood processing technologies to
stimulate the production of high quality products for the domestic and foreign
markets. The projects should change the existing production capacities through a
renewal and a reconstruction of existing wood processing enterprises and the
establishment of new small enterprises based on highly efficient, resource saving
technology.
• Projects should be initiated to build new large and middle-sized enterprises based on
existing joint-stock companies, including foreign firms, and with efficient support
from the state.
• One of the most important measures for pulling the regional forest industrial
complex out of the crisis is a revision of the region’s investment policy which
should also be attractive for foreign capital. Priorities should be set for attracting
foreign capital with a view to solving problems of restructuring the forest industrial
complex and increase its competitiveness. Hereby the policy should make use of a
wide array of measures (not only taxes) in order to stimulate investments (foreign
and domestic) in specific projects. These projects should also be geared to
developing the export potential, to introducing new technology, to increasing labor
productivity, to increasing employment, etc.
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• The methods of industrial forest exploitation should gradually be changed so that
harvesting technologies and used machinery better agree with the forest nature and
make use of its regenerative potential. This would really mean a transition to
sustainable forest use and it should be one of the most important directions in which
to go in the future to come to grips with economic, social and environmental
problems of the forest industrial complex.
• A supportive regime should be elaborated with the purpose of developing the forest
industrial complex further. This regime should:
- improve the legislation regulating forest utilization, and first of all, elaborate
regional rules for final harvesting and a procedure for inventory and
environmental-economic assessment of forest resources;
- come up with suggestions on how to secure future forest areas for forest
industrial enterprises — large wood consumers should be assigned special forest
raw material areas;
- institute a system of payments for forest resources which can be used for regula-
ting rational forest utilization;
- create legal privileges and a financial regime favoring investments braced by
guarantees and state support;
- support efficient functioning of all enterprises that achieve financial recovery;
- ensure a decrease of the tariffs for railway and sea transport, for energy and
energy carriers;
- thoroughly study the technical, economic, and organizational feasibility of
developing energy from wood based on low value forests and forest waste;
- investigate the feasibility of transferring the enterprise owned social structures of
forest settlements into municipal property; and
- strive to restore the scientific and technical capacities of the forest sector.
• Measures should be taken to raise the qualifications of employees in the forest
industrial complex.
• Legislators should strive to improve the forest legislation. The current forest
legislation is based upon the strategically mistaken notion of federal (state) property
for forests and a centralization of forest incomes in the state budget. Thereby the
monopoly of the center is strengthened resulting in deficient financing of forestry
measures.
Different forms of property of forests are needed: state property (federal property
and property of the Subjects of the Federation), municipal and private property.
World practice and the Russian practice before 1917 has shown the advantages of
the coexistence of competitive property forms for forests. The Forest Code gives the
functions of the state forest management and of direct management to one
organization only, the Federal Forest Service of the Russian Federation and its
regional subdivisions. The functions of state control and direct management should
be divided.
Some of the recommendations above, especially concerning the Forest Code and forest
policy, are intended as food for discussion. A well-considered discussion will be of help
in establishing a strategy of institutional restructuring of the Krasnoyarsk forest sector.
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Appendix: Structure of the Joint-Stock Complex
“Yeniseyles” (1997)
I. Parent enterprise
No. Name of Enterprise Basic Activity
1. Joint-Stock Company “Yeniseyles” Coordination of the activity in the
complex, investment and
engineering activity
II.  Branch companies in whose capital a share fraction of the parent enterprise
and/or its affiliated persons amounts to 25 percent
No. Name of Enterprise Basic Activity
1. Joint-Stock Company “Krasnoyarsk Sawing and
Wood Processing Plant”
Sawing
2. Joint-Stock Company “Krasnoyarsk Timber-
Handling Plant”
Sawing, sleeper sawing
3. Joint-Stock Company “Krasnoyarsk Pulp and
Paper Mill”
Pulp and paper production
4. “Yeniseylesozavod” Ltd.* Sawing
5. “Yeniseylesdrev” Ltd.* Wood processing
6. “Yeniseylesstroi” Ltd.* Construction
7. Joint-Stock Company “Ordzhonikidzevskoe
lesozagotovitelnoe predpriyatie”
Harvesting
8. “Ordzhonikidzevsky LPK” Ltd.* Sawing, wood processing
9. Joint-Stock Company “Badzheysky LPKh” Harvesting
* Enterprises established after privatization.
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Financial Group
No. Name of Enterprise Basic Activity
1. Business Bank “Stromkombank” * Banking activity
2. Investment Company “Azhio” Ltd * Investing
* Enterprises established after privatization.
Trade Group
No. Name of Enterprise Basic Activity
1. Joint-Stock Company “Yeniseylesinvest” * Trade and export of forest products
2. Joint-Stock Company “Commercial Center
Yenisey”
Maintenance supply
3. Joint-Stock Company “Kraslestorg” Wholesale and retail trade of
foodstuff as well as consumer
goods
* Enterprises established after privatization.
Service Group
No. Name of Enterprise Basic Activity
1. “Yeniseyles Security” Ltd.* Security
2. “Sanatorium Roev Ruchey” Ltd.* Medical services
* Enterprises established after privatization.
III.  Enterprises in whose capital a share fraction of the parent enterprise and/or
its affiliated persons amounts to 5 percent
No. Name of Enterprise Basic Activity
1. Joint-Stock Business Bank “Yenisey” Banking activity
2. Joint-Stock Company “Forest Industrial
Holding Company Yenisey — Holding”*
Investing
3. Siberian Insurance Company “Astrovaz”* Insurance activities
4. Joint-Stock Company “Strelkovskaya
Lesoperevalochnaya Baza”
Sawing
5. Joint-Stock Company “Bolshemurtinskiy LPKh” Harvesting
* Enterprises established after privatization.
Source: Appendix to “Skhema upravleniya, koordinatsii i regulyatsii deyatel’nosti predpriyatii lesnogo
kompleksa Krasnoyarskogo Kraia” (The scheme of management, coordination and regulation of activity
of the Krasnoyarsk forest complex enterprises), Krasnoyarsk Krai Administration, 1997.
